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RECOMMENDATIONS
THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA 
(RGC) SHOULD:
Systemic Corruption
1. Translate recent renewed pledges to combat
corruption into immediate action. Officials and
RCAF officers involved in corruption and
misappropriation of state assets should be
prosecuted and punished in accordance with the
law. Senior officials and military officers should
be made accountable for the actions of their
subordinates.
2. Ensure full disclosure of documents of public
interest concerning the forest sector, for example
concession boundaries, investment agreements,
details of ownership of the companies
concerned, permits for cutting, transportation,
collection, export of forest products etc. These
documents should be published online, while
printed copies should also be made available
through the Forest Administration1 Public
Affairs Unit.
3. This sector-specific measure should be
underpinned by the introduction of an 
Anti-Corruption Law that imposes severe
penalties on officials found guilty of corrupt
practices, including misappropriation of state
assets. This law should encompass the
following elements:
l Creation of a register of business interests
of politicians, government officials and
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces officers to
be published online and in print and
updated on a quarterly basis. This register
should include declaration of any close
familial links between these officials/officers
and private sector operators whose activities
fall within their jurisdiction. It should be
published in Khmer and English in an
accessible format.
l Provisions guaranteeing the Cambodian public
right of access to information relating to the
management of all state assets.
l Requirement that all contracts/agreements
between the government and private sector
operators concerning land use, harvesting
rights or transfer of ownership, on areas of
state property larger than 100 hectares, be
publicly announced.
l Requirement that all private sector operators
holding concessions on state property publicly
disclose the payments they make to the RGC
in the form of taxes, royalties, signature
bonuses etc. 
l Requirement that the RGC publicly disclose
all taxes, royalties, signature bonuses etc.
generated from concessions on state property.
4. Establish an independent body comprising
ministers, international donors and civil society
representatives to monitor usage of Cambodia’s
natural resources and revenues generated. This
independent body should perform the following
functions:
l Monitor, document and scrutinise management
and sustainable use of Cambodia’s natural
resources. Publish findings on a quarterly basis.
Establish a secretariat to carry out these
functions.
l Monitor investigation by National Audit
Office into all outstanding timber royalties
owed to the Cambodian state; monitor future
payment of royalties and other fees and
payments related to timber and other natural
resources. Publish findings on a quarterly basis. 
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
1. Withdraw all military units stationed inside or
on the boundaries of protected areas.
2. Disclose the location and legal status of all the
Military Development Zones. Terminate all such
zones that are situated on forestland, in protected
areas, or are otherwise contrary to the law.
3. Alleviate the threat to Cambodia’s forests
posed by an oversized and largely redundant
military. Cancel the recently announced plans to
re-introduce conscription for men aged 18-30.
Embark on wide-ranging reform of the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces. Principal outcomes
of this reform process should be: 
i) the creation of a professional military that
meets Cambodia’s defence needs and 
ii) demobilisation of all troops surplus to these
requirements.
Reform Forest Management
1. Terminate the forest concession system, in line
with Recommendation D/21 of the 2004
Independent Forest Sector Review
commissioned by the RGC and donors.2 
2. Maintain the existing moratoria on logging
and transportation of logs, until the following
steps have been completed:
l Completion of a new national plan for
sustainable management of the forests, in line
with Article 59 of the Cambodian
constitution.a This national plan should be
based on the recommendations of the
Independent Forest Sector Review.
l Completion of all outstanding sub-decrees and
directives required under the 2002 Forestry
Law, including delineation of the permanent
forest estate and forest reserve. All draft sub-
decrees and directives should be made publicly
available prior to passage, allowing sufficient
time for public comment.
l Completion of all outstanding sub-decrees and
directives in the 2001 Land Law relating to
reduction in area of land concessions larger
than 10,000ha. These draft sub-decrees and
directives should be made publicly available
prior to passage, allowing sufficient time for
public comment.
l Disclosure of full details of all agro-
industrial land concessions. Termination of
all such concessions that are situated on
forestland, in protected areas, or are
otherwise contrary to the law, for example:
APP / Green Elite in Koh Kong; Pheapimex
in Pursat and Kompong Chhnang;
Wuzhishan LS Group in Mondulkiri; Green
Sea in Stung Treng.
3. Complete the draft Protected Areas Law. The
draft law should be made publicly available prior
to passage, allowing sufficient time for public
comment.
4. Impose a moratorium on the construction of
roads on forestland, in line with Recommendation
D/32 of the 2004 Independent Forest Sector
Review commissioned by the RGC and donors.
Law Enforcement
Establish an inter-agency authority independent
from forest management functions to monitor
forest crimes and undertake law enforcement
operations. This agency could be supported by
civil society organisations and financed by a
trust fund managed by the international donor
Working Group on Natural Resource
Management.
INTERNATIONAL DONORS SHOULD:
At the Consultative Group meeting, Cambodia’s
international donors should link disbursement of
non-humanitarian aid to demonstrable progress in
implementing these reforms in accordance with set
time-lines.
aArticle 59 of the 1993 Cambodian Constitution, which has
never been implemented, states that: “The State shall protect the
environment and balance of abundant natural resources and
establish a precise plan of management of land, water, air, wind,
geology, ecological system, mines, energy, petrol and gas, rocks
and sand, gems, forests and forestry products, wildlife, fish and
aquatic resources.”
Forest Crimes in Aural Wildlife Sanctuary
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2 FOREST CRIMES IN AURAL WILDLIFE SANCTUARY BY INSTITUTION:
Royal Government of Cambodia
Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia
Ministry of Defence and RCAF National Command
General Tea Banh, Co-Minister of Defence
General Nhek Bun Chhay, Co-Minister of Defence
General Ke Kimyan, Commander in Chief, RCAF
General Pol Saroeun, Deputy Commander in Chief, RCAF
General Meas Sophea, Deputy Commander in Chief, RCAF; Commander, Army
Military Region 3 Personnel
Major-General Keo Samuan, Commander, MR3
Brigadier-General Srun Saroeun
Brigadier-General Kong Bunthan
Major In Sokhear
Colonel Sort Suy
Major Tep Sambath
RCAF Military Intelligence Division
Lieutenant-General Mol Roeup, National Commander
Lieutenant-General Dom Hak
Chan Chao, Military Intelligence Unit operational in Aural
Hun Sen’s Bodyguard Unit B-70
Major-General Hing Bun Heang, Commander
Brigadier-General Mao Sophann
Colonel Mao and Colonel Maorng
Military Police
Lieutenant-General Sao Sokha, National Commander
Men Sibon, Deputy Commander, Kompong Speu Province 
Saom Puthdara, Commander, Aural District
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
Chan Sarun, Minister, MAFF
Forest Administration
Ty Sokhun, Director
Ieng Saveth, Head of Forest Crime Monitoring
Roath Sovannara, Head of Mobile Task Force
Ta Nang, Deputy-Head of Mobile Task Force
Phan Pheary, Head, Sangke Sartob Section
Ministry of Environment
Mok Mareth, Minister of Environment
Chay Samith, Director, Dept. Nature Conservation & Protection
Ty Tola, Ranger, Aural Wildlife Sanctuary
Ministry of Interior
Sar Kheng, Co-Minister of Interior
Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Co-Minister of Interior
Police
General Hok Lundy, National Director-General
Nob Oeun, Commander, Kompong Speu Province
Chea Daro, Economic Police, Kompong Speu Province
Dos Sim, Commander, Aural District
Local Government
Ou Bun, Governor, Kompong Speu Province
Yim Sokhom, Deputy Governor, Kompong Speu Province
Chem Sarim, Governor, Aural District
Key = Command responsibility for subordinates involved in forest crime,   = Receives payments levied through extortion
= Provides armed protection to timber traders,  = Participates directly in illegal timber trade
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the aforementioned East Asia FLEG agreement and the
subsequent Africa FLEG process (launched October
2003). Both these processes have been supported by the
World Bank and other major donors. 
A small number of cases have shown that donor
anti-corruption rhetoric can be translated into action.
In May 2004, concern at high-level government
corruption prompted the IMF to suspend disbursement
of a US$35 million loan to Kenya. A new date for
disbursement (December 2004) was only agreed after
the Kenyan government introduced substantive
measures to combat the problem. 
The IMF’s own internal guidelines call for “greater
attention by the IMF to governance issues, in particular
through: An even-handed treatment of governance
issues in all member countries”.9 However, the Fund has
shown little inclination to take a similarly robust stand
on corruption in Cambodia.
Cambodia’s donors are universally aware of the
damaging impact of corruption on the development
agenda that they claim to support. Few, however, are
willing to publicly acknowledge this state of affairs and
none are prepared to insist on measures to address it.
The donor institution that has been arguably most vocal
on the subject of corruption in Cambodia is the World
Bank. Upon being confronted with the extent of the
problem in the forest sector, however, the Bank has
retreated from its initial insistence on comprehensive
reform; undermining the forestry reform process and
its own credibility in the process.
Initiated in 2000, the World Bank’s US$30 million
Structural Adjustment Credit to Cambodia
incorporated a range of conditions concerning forest
sector management. The Cambodian government
would be required to fulfil these in order to trigger
release of the loan’s second tranche of US$15 million.
While by no means comprehensive, the SAC
conditions encompassed structural and regulatory
changes critical to the success of forest sector reform.
The vested interests of senior officials ensured that
several of these conditions were never met.10 Despite
this, in December 2003, the World Bank released the
second and final tranche of US$15 million. The most
likely explanation for the Bank’s climb-down was its
urge to disburse the SAC and proceed to another
round of less conditional and less contentious loans to
Cambodia. However, the Bank sought to justify itself
by arguing that the RGC had honoured its
commitments. This completed a shift that saw the
Bank moving from a firm stand on forest sector
reform in Cambodia to endorsing breaches of its own
lending conditions.
One of the World Bank’s more implausible
justifications for releasing the SAC money was its
claim that the RGC had “achieved satisfactory
progress” in combating corruption.11 The Bank
reached this conclusion at the end of a year in which
its own Poverty and Investment Climate Survey
(PICS) showed that Cambodia was suffering from
“weak rule of law, bureaucratic costs and corruption”.
Companies participating in this survey cited corruption
as their main constraint.
Six months after releasing the US$15 million
tranche, moreover, the Bank’s own Implementation
Completion Report on the SAC appeared to contradict
its previous position, concluding that the “outcome of
the activities achieved so far is strenuous and fragile at
best with some possible risks for backtracking, especially
in expenditure management, forestry sector
management and governance and fighting
corruption.”12 To complete the impression of studied
inconsistency, in October 2004, the Bank released a
statement on forest sector policy in Cambodia, which
noted that “without improved governance… we are not
likely to overcome the obstacles posed by corruption”.13
This debacle typifies the pattern of RGC-donor
relations established over several years. A tough line
from the donors on governance, corruption and forest
sector reform is routinely parroted and then
disregarded by the government. The RGC is never held
to account for failing to meet its commitments, the aid
continues to flow and the status quo prevails. Does this
benefit Cambodians outside the entrenched elite? 
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3 INTRODUCTION
“We need to work on further improvements in
governance if we are to make more than a dent in
poverty,”3 Hun Sen, Prime Minister, Consultative Group meeting, 2002
“We’ve been told that corruption is a major hindrance to
development. But did Enron or WorldCom prevent
America from being rich?” 4 Ty Sokhun, Director, Forest
Administration, 2004
Six years after the Cambodian government pledged to
reform the country’s forest sector, the main obstacle to
real change – corruption – has not been addressed.
Cambodian functionaries and soldiers charged with
suppressing forest crime use their office as a basis for
extortion, rather than law enforcement. They are
encouraged, even compelled to do so by senior 
officials in Phnom Penh who control the opaque
patronage networks that substitute for a system of
governance in Cambodia.5
Global Witness and others have highlighted the
extent of corruption in Cambodia’s forest sector over
almost a decade. The government and international
donors have refused to confront the issue, however, with
the result that Cambodia’s forest sector reform process
has not realised its objectives. Cambodia remains
completely dependent on foreign aid. Meanwhile, the
costs of weak forest sector governance, in terms of lost
revenues, destruction of rural livelihoods and
environmental damage, continue to mount.
This report presents the findings of a series of
Global Witness investigations into illegal logging in
Aural Wildlife Sanctuary in southwestern Cambodia in
2004. Conditions in Aural precisely illustrate the
institutionalised corruption prevalent across the
country and the government’s conspicuous failure to
address it. 
Among the many serious issues the Aural case
highlights, is the role of the Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces (RCAF). Cambodia faces no imminent external
threats, yet the government spends approximately 25%
of its meagre budget on a bloated army of around
110,000. In addition to these actual personnel, RCAF is
augmented by some 32,000 dead or fictitious “ghost
soldiers”, whose names are maintained on the payroll so
that commanders can pocket their salaries.6 In the
absence of a strategic imperative, RCAF devotes its
energies to black economy business ventures, notably
illegal logging operations, which are founded on its
capacity to threaten and use armed force. The
institution’s overall profile is that of a vast organised
crime network. 
A US$18 million demobilization programme funded
by the World Bank collapsed in 2003 amid allegations
of high level corruption and has not been revived.7 The
Cambodian government, meanwhile, displays little
interest in reforming RCAF and turning it into a force
tailored to Cambodia’s defence needs. Indeed, in
September 2004, the government adopted a draft law 
re-introducing conscription for men aged 18-30 – a
measure that, if passed, is likely to inflate RCAF ranks
and senior commanders’ power yet further. Without a
radical change in approach, Cambodia will continue to
bear the burden of a military whose core capacity is
theft of the country’s natural resources, rather than
protection of its borders.
Aural also testifies to the lack of government
commitment to preserving the country’s protected
areas, where cutting of trees is prohibited under any
circumstances. The wildlife sanctuary’s centerpiece,
Aural Mountain, is Cambodia’s highest peak and an
important part of the country’s natural heritage. In the
absence of rule of law, however, Aural is not only
subject to innumerable logging operations, but also
plays host to a substantial downstream timber-
processing industry. 
The government’s failure to tackle the problem
contravenes national law, notably the 2002 Forestry
Law, which demands the fining and imprisonment of
officials who fail to take action against forest crime. It
also places Cambodia in breach of international
commitments under the 2001 East Asian Ministerial
Declaration on Forest Law Enforcement and
Governance (FLEG), as well as the 2002 Interpol
resolution on combating corruption in police
forces/services. Both these documents are reproduced
as appendices of this report.
The systemic corruption which the Aural case
exemplifies thrives on the utter lack of transparency
within Cambodia’s forest sector. Basic information
concerning government decisions that have far reaching
impacts on the country’s forests and the rural
population are not made available, much less justified,
to those affected. The identity, location and purpose of
economic concessions, coupes and military
development zones, not to mention RCAF units, is not
disclosed. This culture of secrecy reflects the
government’s desire to avoid accountability for poor
decisions based on the political and financial interests of
those in power.
3.1 The Role of Donors in Combating Corruption in
Cambodia’s Forest Sector
In recent years multilateral donors such as the World
Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank and European
Union, as well as influential bilateral donors, have made
governance reform and eradication of corruption a key
part of their overall policy agenda.8 At the same time,
donor countries have supported the introduction of
international agreements addressing these issues,
notably the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (signed
1997) and the recent UN Convention against
Corruption (signed December 2003).
With specific reference to the forest sector, themes
of governance and anti-corruption form the bedrock of World Bank office, Phnom Penh
Introduction
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3.2 Hard Talk or Hot Air? 
The World Bank’s Variable
Perception of Corruption 
in Cambodia
“The Bank explicitly considers
in its lending decisions the
extent to which the quality of
governance and the magnitude
of corruption affect a borrowing
country’s economy.” The World
Bank’s Anti-Corruption Strategy 17 
“The World Bank views 
good governance and 
anti-corruption as central to its
poverty alleviation mission.” 
The World Bank18 
1. February 2000: The World Bank says that
“formulating and implementing a strategy on
enhancing governance and fighting corruption” is one
of the three areas in which its Structural Adjustment
Credit (SAC) aims to help Cambodia.19
2. May 2000: The Bank releases the results of a
survey that paints a gloomy picture of corruption in
Cambodia. Urban citizens and foreign companies
view “corruption in the public sector” as the most
serious problem in the country. (For rural citizens
and domestic firms, “corruption in the public sector”
is the second most frequently cited problem.) Foreign
enterprises report that they have to pay bribes in 68%
of dealings with public officials. 66% of survey
participants believe that corruption is “much worse”
than it was three years ago. Nobody thinks that it is
“much better”.20
3. June 2002: Prime Minister Hun Sen promises
that an anti-corruption law will be passed by the
National Assembly before June 2003.21
4. June 2003: The anti-corruption law deadline
passes without any law being adopted. In fact, the law
has still not been passed today. 
5. 2003: A World Bank survey on Cambodia’s
investment climate reveals a picture of “weak rule
of law, bureaucratic costs, and corruption”.
Cambodian firms identify corruption as their
leading constraint, with approximately three-
quarters of firms identifying the problem as
“moderate”, “major” or “very severe”. Four-fifths
of survey participants acknowledge the necessity of
paying bribes, and 71% of large firms report that
these payments are frequent.22
6. December 2003: Disregarding the results of its
survey, the government’s failure to pass the promised
anti-corruption law and evidence of pervasive
corruption in the forest sector, the World Bank
releases the second tranche of the SAC, worth 
US$15 million. The Bank declares that Cambodia 
has “achieved satisfactory progress” in “enhancing
governance and fighting corruption”.11
7. June 2004: Despite claiming that Cambodia had
“achieved satisfactory progress” on corruption only a
few months earlier, the World Bank reverts to saying
that the “outcome of the activities achieved so far is
strenuous and fragile at best with some possible risks for
backtracking, especially in expenditure management,
forestry sector management, and governance and
fighting corruption”. It acknowledges that “corruption
was perceived as widespread in Cambodia and
undermined the country’s development efforts”.12
8. August 2004: The Bank unveils its Investment
Climate Assessment and Reform Strategy, based on
the results of its 2003 investment climate survey. The
report emphasises the extent of institutionalised
corruption in Cambodia.23
9. August 2004: This is followed by a statement
on Cambodia’s forest sector saying that “The forestry
sector in Cambodia is badly affected by corruption
and, unless properly managed, will not only fail to
deliver adequate resources to the people of the country
but could actually make the poor even worse off”.24
10. October 2004: The Bank publishes comments
on the Independent Forest Sector Review, noting that
“without improved governance… we are not likely to
overcome the obstacles posed by corruption”.13
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The conclusions of the UNDP’s 2004 Human
Development Report would suggest otherwise:
“Cambodia remains the worst performer in East
Asia and the Pacific when it comes to its Human
Poverty Index, which focuses on the most deprived in
multiple dimensions of poverty to include the proportion
of people below a threshold level in respect of longevity,
access to education and a decent standard of living.
Significant challenges remain in advancing gender
equality in key areas of economic and political life.”14
Meanwhile, in the words of the Japanese government
aid agency, JICA:
“Good governance has been deficient in Cambodia
and some Cambodian people have little confidence in
the government due to a chronic shortage of revenues,
an inefficient and ineffective administrative system,
rampant corruption and a distrust of military and police
organizations.”15
It is surely no coincidence that, after a decade in
which billions of dollars of donor money have
accounted for half Cambodia’s national budget year
after year, there is mounting evidence that, in terms of
development, remarkably little has been achieved.
So far as donors have addressed the issue of
corruption in Cambodia, this has revolved around
internal safeguards to protect their own disbursements
of aid. As the case of the World Bank-funded
demobilisation programme shows, these are sometimes
less than effective.
While important, internal safeguarding of aid
disbursements does little to improve Cambodia’s system
of governance. Yet it is invariably external, governance-
related conditions that ultimately determine aid
interventions’ success or failure. However well-audited
aid programmes are, their benefits are inevitably limited
if their outputs are obstructed or misappropriated
through corruption and weak governance. Amidst the
proliferation of expensive aid interventions, it is worth
noting that some basic measures to improve governance,
for example mandatory public disclosure of information
relating to the management of state assets, would carry
little, if any, additional cost. 
Forests constitute, in the words of the World Bank,
“Cambodia’s most developmentally important natural
resource”16, but they are being steadily degraded,
primarily as a result of corruption and deficiencies in
governance. Destruction of the forests directly threatens
a large section of the rural population who depend on
non-timber forest products for their livelihoods. The
secondary impacts are potentially equally severe. The
soil erosion that typically results from deforestation is
already damaging Cambodia’s agricultural and fisheries
sectors. Both of these are areas that the RGC and donors
have identified as pivotal to rural development.
The Consultative Group (CG) meeting scheduled
for December 2004 offers a critical opportunity for
government and international donors to address these
issues and the overall setbacks in forest sector reform.
Donors must demand tangible, timetabled progress in
combating corruption, increasing transparency and
strengthening forest sector governance and link this to
any further disbursements in non-humanitarian aid.
The alternative amounts to rewarding practices that are
destroying Cambodia’s natural heritage and
undermining the country’s long-term development.
World Bank office, Phnom Penh
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Despite these changes, Aural remained very much a
military fiefdom, with a local system of governance
skewed by the presence of large numbers of soldiers
answering to the RCAF command structure rather than
civil authorities. In common with most RCAF units,
the soldiers remaining in and around Aural had no
meaningful military function. Post-conflict, their main
preoccupation became generation of income for
themselves and their commanders, principally through
illegal logging. 
Although the government staged a series of highly
publicised crackdown operations against illegal loggers
in 1999-2000, military-supported logging operations in
Aural continued. Following the suspension of cutting in
Cambodia’s forest concessions in January 2002, a
combination of factors stimulated the expansion of the
timber industry in Aural:
● The area was dominated by RCAF, an institution
that had a stake in the illegal timber industry and
the capacity to protect it.
● The principal focus of the donor-driven forest
sector reform process was curbing illegal activities
by logging companies operating concessions, with
less attention paid to protected areas. 
● Within southwestern Cambodia, meanwhile,
international NGO-supported law enforcement
operations in the Central Cardamoms 
Protected Forest, adjacent to Aural, had made
logging there more difficult. Few measures had
yet been taken to turn Aural’s protected status
into reality, however.
● Thanks to the improved road access, Aural was
within close reach of important markets, such as
Phnom Penh, major provincial towns and
Vietnam. The improved communications also
enabled timber traders to move equipment and
personnel into the area with ease.
As Aural became an increasingly attractive place to do
business, more timber traders moved into the area, setting
up depots and other downstream facilities in villages such
as Kantuot and Spean Daik in the heart of the wildlife
sanctuary. Here they could take advantage not only of a
resource, but also an ample supply of labour. This
consisted of the locally-based RCAF soldiers, as well as
residents of other districts of Kompong Speu, such as
Borseth, Thpong, Samraong Tong and Oudong. In
addition, people from neighbouring provinces, including
Takeo, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng, moved to Aural to find
jobs and profit in the timber trade. 
Some of these local migrants, notably people from
Takeo province, came to the area because of their links
with military personnel stationed in Aural. Many of the
soldiers fighting the Khmer Rouge in Aural during the
1980s and 1990s were drawn from Takeo. With the end
of the conflict, they demobilised and returned home,
but kept up links with former comrades who remained
in the area. Facing difficulties finding land and
livelihood in Takeo, some made their way back to Aural
to work in the timber business. 
As Aural’s timber industry has expanded, however,
so has the range of stakeholders involved. Aural has
become a honey pot not only for locally-based RCAF
troops, but also special military units and other state
agencies, for whom reaping a share of the spoils is as
easy as setting up a checkpoint and waiting by the side
of the road. This creates a vicious circle – the greater the
number of soldiers and officials profiting, the more the
industry is protected from outside attempts to curb it. 
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PART ONE – BACKGROUND &
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
4 AURAL – A SANCTUARY 
FOR LOGGERS?
“The uplands of Mount Aural sequester one of the most
expansive and pristine forests of Indochina. They also
sequester a natural ecosystem and ‘biodiversity hotspot’
that is still virtually unknown to science. From the air,
one observes a dissected terrain that is formed by a
labyrinth of variously angled slopes and hidden valleys.
Each of these is linked to another by an unbroken
canopy of trees. Above 500 m, there is hardly a trace of
roadcuts or footpaths. Invasive roads and evidence of
illegal logging activities are commonly observed,
however, at the base of the mountain, and seem to
portend trouble for Aural’s pristine core regions. One
can only hope that the mountain range and its unique
biota are spared the same fate as disturbed mountainous
landscapes in Thailand and Vietnam.”25 Dr J. Andrew
McDonald, Plant Resources Center, University of Texas at Austin, 2004 
Aural Wildlife Sanctuary was given protected status
under the 1993 Royal Decree on Protected Areas, at a time
when the area was still contested by Khmer Rouge and
government forces. Its designation as a wildlife sanctuary
reflected not only its high conservation value, but also the
willingness of the government of the time to grant
protected status to regions that it did not fully control.
Fighting in Aural ended in 1995. Under the terms of
the peace agreement between Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces (RCAF) and Khmer Rouge commanders, the
Khmer Rouge troops were integrated into RCAF and
stayed in Aural. So did many of their former adversaries
on the government side. 
The end of the conflict in Aural drew a line under
the area’s isolation. During the mid 1990s, an
international NGO paid for the upgrading of Route 42
between Route 4 and Kantuot, thus reducing travel time
from Phnom Penh to around two and a half hours. The
road enabled easy access to land and timber resources in
Aural and accelerated migration into the area. 
Aerial view of Aural Wildlife Sanctuary
Phnom Penh
Mount Aural 
Wildlife Sanctuary
Tonle Sap Lake
CAMBODIA
Part One – Background & Industry Structure/Aural – A Sanctuary for Loggers?
5 AURAL’S ILLEGAL TIMBER INDUSTRY
“There is no more illegal logging in Cambodia… we
have brought everything under control. We have very
good, fundamental conditions for sustainable forest
management in Cambodia.” 26 Ty Sokhun, Director, Forest
Administration, 2003
The timber industry in Aural focuses on extraction
of commercial grade wood for use in construction and
also luxury timbers used to make furnishings. Much of
the luxury timber and a proportion of the commercial
grade wood cut in the wildlife sanctuary are exported to
Vietnam. Many of the timber businesses operating in
Aural target both, however there are ways in which
these different types of timber are extracted and taxed
which are distinct from one another. 
The logging, processing and timber transporting
operations in Aural are all illegal under the 1994
Ministerial Prakas (Decision) on Protected Areas and
Chapter 15 of the 2002 Forestry Law; including Article
98, which carries penalties of one to five years in prison
and fines of US$2,500-25,000. 
There is a wide spectrum of operators in Aural and
the majority work on a much smaller scale than the big
timber dealers. A large number of military, police and
civilians own chainsaws and sawmills and either work
with the main wood traders or run their own
businesses. The roles of many of these actors are over-
lapping – police and soldiers who have their own timber
businesses, also extort money, for example. 
The industry operates around informal networks, is
flexible, and adapts very quickly to changes in
circumstances. This fluidity makes definitive
information on numbers of operators and machines
rather elusive. An impression is offered, nonetheless, by
estimates provided by officials and soldiers for
communes within Aural district:
Trapeang Chou commune, April 2004:
120 chainsaws
5 sawmills operating band saws
6 sawmills operating large fixed circular saws
3 sawmills operating small, portable circular saws27
Am Leang commune, May 2004:
65 chainsaws
3 sawmills operating large fixed circular saws
6 sawmills operating small, portable circular saws27
All communes in Aural district, April 2004:
450 chainsaws
65 sawmills operating band saws
35 sawmills operating large fixed circular saws28
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Tensions in Aural between some of these groups
have become increasingly apparent over recent months.
Considering the abundance of competing protection
rackets, however, the number of open conflicts
between them has been arguably rather low. Generally
speaking, there has always been room for one more
snout in the trough.
Efforts to clamp down on illegal logging in Aural
have centred around conservation programmes
supported by two international NGOs. Floral and
Fauna International (FFI) works with Ministry of
Environment (MoE) officials responsible for managing
the wildlife sanctuary, while Conservation International
(CI) cooperates with officials from the Forest
Administration (FA) and military police across the
Cardamom Mountain range in southwestern Cambodia. 
A sequence of law enforcement operations led by
these groups in early 2004 disrupted Aural’s timber
trade and contributed to severe friction between
soldiers and Ministry of Environment rangers based in
Aural. This culminated in a series of armed
confrontations over the weekend of 19-21 March. In
the worst of these, two people – a villager and a
military policeman working with Conservation
International – were shot and wounded. In the
aftermath, FFI suspended their activities in Aural and
their Ministry of Environment counterparts likewise
withdrew from the area. At this point, efforts to
enforce the law within the wildlife sanctuary
effectively ceased.
Evergreen forest, Aural Mountain Sawmill on boundary of wildlife sanctuary
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Soldier at cutting site in Aural Wildlife Sanctuary, 2004
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sanctuary’s northern and western boundaries. The main
means of access to these sawmills is the road running
from Bamnak through Reang Khvav village. Another
track starting near Bamnak, follows a more southwesterly
direction to the slopes of Aural Mountain.
Most of the sawmills consist of rotary band saws
mounted on rails, are operated by four to five people
and are highly mobile. They can be quickly dismantled
and moved, in the event of law enforcement operations
or the source of timber becoming exhausted.32
5.1.2 Timber Extraction and Processing
The timber traders do not usually retain a large
workforce and tend to hire people as loggers on a
casual basis. They also buy wood directly from
chainsaw owners who arrange processing and
extraction of timber by themselves. Aside from
soldiers from units such as Battalion 313, a high
proportion of those involved in actually felling 
trees are local migrants. Many of the cutters rent
their equipment from the timber traders clustered 
in Kantuot and Spean Daik, who also supply them
with fuel. 
Cutting sites are selected according to accessibility.
Once all trees of commercial value have been cut in one
location, the loggers push further into the mountain
complex in search of more. The end result is the
removal of all mature trees of commercial species from
an expanding swathe of forest around the base of
Mount Aural.33
The loggers and timber dealers typically
commission locally based ox-cart owners to transport
timber from cutting sites to sawmills and then back to
the dealer’s depot. There are around 400 ox-carts
operating in Aural in this capacity.34
Timber businesses that pay bribes to the right
officials are able to operate fairly openly in Aural.
However, there remains a residual threat posed by
occasional enforcement operations lead by international
conservation NGOs, which deters them from
maintaining large stocks of timber in depots within 
the wildlife sanctuary, where they could be confiscated
or destroyed.32
The nature of the business is therefore dictated by
orders placed by clients. Orders prompt businesses to
commission cutting and processing of timber. In the
absence of orders, they would not necessarily go on
accumulating stocks of timber. In practice, the level of
demand and the absence of law enforcement ensures
that illegal logging and processing continue at a high
intensity. However, the order-driven nature of the
system means that timber felled and processed in Aural
is transported out of the area to the customer with
minimum delay.32
Interviews with workers in Aural suggest that the
large and medium sized timber businesses typically
follow a cycle of activities triggered by receipt of an
order from a client:
Part One – Background & Industry Structure/Aural – A Sanctuary for Loggers?
TAKING A CUT13
5.1 Sawn Timber
There is now a high concentration of wood traders
based in the timber villages of Kantuot and Spean Daik
in the centre of Aural, sourcing wood from the forests
on and around the slopes of Aural Mountain and areas
of forest towards the western and southern edges of the
wildlife sanctuary. Che’en village, closer to the slopes of
the mountain, is also emerging as an important hub.
These timber businesses most heavily exploit grade one
and two tree species and they frequently employ local
people who know the forest well to identify prime
cutting locations.29
Most dealers focus on providing buyers in
Cambodia and Vietnam with timber that has already
been processed into planks using chainsaws or sawmills.
This is in part because a high proportion of their
customers require sawn timber for construction, rather
than logs for plywood or veneer manufacture. The sawn
timber focus also reflects patterns in the illegal wood
business across Cambodia.30
While large quantities of timber continue to be
logged and transported across Cambodia, the cutting
and transportation moratoria imposed in 2002 have had
some impact nonetheless. Following the May 2002
moratorium on log transportation, transporting round
wood is now generally perceived by timber traders as
too conspicuous a violation to be worth risking. There
are important exceptions to this pattern, moreover it
should be stressed that the risk stems less from the
likelihood of being prosecuted, than the exorbitant fees
which foresters, police and others would demand in
order to turn a blind eye.30
Timber dealers thus find it easier to move wood that
has already been sawn into planks and can be passed off
as recently processed “old logs”.31 Within Aural Wildlife
Sanctuary, where, on the one hand, the timber traders
enjoy a high degree of impunity, and on the other, all
timber extraction and processing is illegal anyway, 
this is less of a consideration. However, once the 
wood is transported outside Aural, it is more likely to
be confiscated before reaching the customer if it is
unprocessed round logs.
5.1.1 Sawmills
The emphasis on sawn timber has encouraged a
significant expansion in the number of sawmills
operating in Aural over the past two years. Some of
these are set up in yards and compounds in and around
villages such as Kantuot and Spean Daik. Others,
probably the majority, are assembled in or on the edge
of patches of forest, close to cutting sites. Many are
situated in valleys, however, as the timber source
recedes, more are being established in the sanctuary’s
montane forest within the Aural Mountain complex.30
In 2004, several of the largest sawmills have been
located in the northern part of the valley running north-
south on the west side of Aural Mountain; inside Pursat
and Military Region 5 (MR5) and close to the wildlife
Sawn timber transported by ox-cart convoy
Sawmill in the core area of the Mount Aural massive, 
UTM 407527 1337015
Sawmills in valley west of Aural Mountain
Timber village Kantuot
Sawmill near the northern boundary of the wildlife sanctuary,
UTM 385559 1342884
Sawmill near the northern boundary of the wildlife sanctuary,
UTM 382677 1345584
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because trucks are able to travel by
day without interference (beyond the
usual fees to officials) and are now
operating around the clock. Some
indication of the level of timber traffic
departing Aural is offered by the
demise of one of the bridges along
Route 42, which collapsed under the
weight of timber trucks at the end of
March.
In April, conservation workers
estimated that there were five trucks
permanently based in Kantuot and
more than 20 in Spean Daik.37
Subsequent investigations suggest that
by June there were approximately 
20-40 trucks carrying timber out of the
wildlife sanctuary each day.34 These
vehicles vary in size. Most are small
three ton trucks capable of transporting
around 3-5 m3 of sawn timber, although
some businesses use much larger models
with a capacity of around 35 m3. 
This increase in timber transports
forms part of the overall upsurge in
illegal activities since the end of March
2004. Logging has rapidly increased, as
has the number of sawmills. The timber
industry anticipates that Ministry of
Environment and FFI staff will fully
resume activities in the coming months
and has therefore gone into overdrive to
take advantage of the absence of law
enforcement.38 As one RCAF officer
put it, “Since FFI and the MoE rangers
pulled out, no children attend school in
Aural, because their families have sent
them all to the forest to help with the
logging activities,”.28
5.2 Luxury Timber
In addition to extracting commercial
grade wood for construction, Aural’s
illegal timber industry also revolves
around the cutting of luxury grade
species used in the manufacture of
furnishings. Many of these woods are
listed as rare or endangered in a recent
study undertaken by the Forest
Administration in conjunction with the
Danish government.39 They are
protected by Cambodian law and may
not be cut under any circumstances. 
Many of the main players involved
in the extraction, processing and
transportation of commercial grade
wood also play a role in the sourcing of
luxury species. Despite the overlaps
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1. The timber dealer commissions chainsaw
operators to cut. Frequently, the dealer rents out
their own cutting equipment for this purpose.
Chainsaw operators are paid US$2.5 per day for
labour, or according to the number of m3 they
harvest. The trader may also provide the fuel for
the chainsaw. 
2. Either the timber business or the loggers arrange
the rental of ox-carts for transportation of the
timber from cutting site to sawmill and from
sawmill out of the forest once processing is
completed. The ox-cart owners are paid according
to the volume they transport.
3. Once the chainsaw operators have felled the
requisite number of trees, the ox-carts transport
the logs to one of the numerous sawmills around
the slopes of Aural Mountain. The timber trader
may own their own sawmill or they may pay an
independently owned mill to process the wood.
The rate for this service is usually around US$40
per m3 of sawn timber processed. The price is
higher if the wood is luxury grade, which is
denser and more difficult to cut. 
4. Once processed, the ox-carts carry the sawn
timber out of the forest back to the timber trader.
Ox-carts leaving the forest are obliged to pay
bribes at the numerous checkpoints along the
way. If the loggers are not soldiers themselves, the
timber trader may hire RCAF personnel to escort
the timber. This ensures that the convoy pays less
at the checkpoints. Hiring two soldiers to
accompany 15-30 ox-carts can cost the timber
trader around US$100.
There are a number of variations on this pattern.
For example, when there are fewer sawmills in
operation, more of the trees felled are processed into
planks at the cutting site, using chainsaws. Processing
by hand with a chainsaw is difficult, time consuming
and wasteful of timber. Loggers in Aural report that
timber dealers often cite poor standards of processing as
grounds for paying them less than the sum originally
agreed on.33
The cost of the fees and bribes which the timber
trader has to pay to expedite this process is passed on to
the client, who is required to pay as much as 50% of the
agreed price up front.32
5.1.3 Timber transports from Aural
Once in Kantuot or Spean Daik, trucks carry the timber
out along one of at least four roads connecting with the
main arteries Route 4 and Route 5. Destinations for the
wood are most commonly Kompong Speu, Oudong,
Phnom Penh, and Vietnam. A certain amount of the
timber leaving Aural is transported north by ox-cart as
far as the railway line – a journey of as much as two
days. From here, it is loaded into passenger carriages
and transported south to Bat Deung and other stations
close to Phnom Penh.34
Timber transports from Aural to Vietnam are
secretive and hard to quantify. Anecdotal evidence
suggests, however, that these exports have expanded
significantly in the past two to three years and are a
significant driver of the deforestation process in Aural.34
Vietnam’s role as an importer is in direct contravention
of its commitments under the international FLEG
(Forest Law Enforcement and Governance) process.
Vietnam and Cambodia both endorsed to the
Ministerial Declaration issued at the FLEG East Asia
Ministerial Conference of September 2001. As such,
they committed to “Undertake actions, including
cooperation among the law enforcement authorities
within and among countries, to prevent the movement
of illegal timber” also to “Take immediate action to
intensify national efforts, and to strengthen bilateral,
regional and multilateral collaboration to address
violations of forest law and forest crime, in particular
illegal logging, associated illegal trade and corruption,
and their negative effects on the rule of law.”35
In practice, Vietnam currently imports a large
proportion of the timber being cut illegally in
Cambodia, through a variety of border crossings. 
These include hundreds of truckloads of round 
logs illegally felled by Cambodian border police
Battalion 1, commanded by Phonn Sophat, in Virachey
National Park in Ratanakiri in April to May 2004. 
This operation, which was commissioned by
Vietnamese timber companies, netted Phonn Sophat
approximately US$20,000. The failure of the
Vietnamese authorities to intercept a cross border
operation of this scale suggests either complicity or a
spectacular level of incompetence.26
Prior to the departure of Ministry of
Environment rangers and FFI staff at the end of
March, trucks carrying timber out of Aural typically
began their journeys between three and four am.37
This would allow them to avoid most checkpoints
and arrive at their destination – whether Phnom Penh
or even Vietnam – before midday. Since the end of
March the pattern has become much less defined,
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Tumloap luxury-grade timber
Nocturnal timber transport along Route 42
Transportation of luxury-grade timber: Neang Nuon
Luxury timber slabs in converted saloon car
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Vietnamese officials had become more aware of the
value of the trade and were demanding much higher
bribes than before. This posed difficulties for
Vietnamese importers, who thus scaled back their
orders to suppliers in Cambodia.
The prices for Tumloap and other luxury woods
fluctuate according to availability and market demand.
According to one timber dealer sourcing wood from
Aural, the prices in July per m3 for four other types of
luxury wood were as follows:
Species of tree Price at Price in
cutting site Phnom Penh 
Beng US$300 per m3 US$600 per m3
Neang Nuon US$400 per m3 US$750 per m3
Thnong US$280 per m3 US$500 per m3
Kranhung US$350 per m3 US$700 per m3
Other sources provide similar estimates, which
differ from these figures by a margin of up to 20%.
As in other areas of Cambodia, years of illegal logging
have taken a heavy toll on luxury timber species in Aural.
With few mature trees left standing, cutters are targeting
ever-smaller specimens. The decline in the populations of
these trees has prompted the Forest Administration and
the Danish government to make several of them the focus
of its Conservation of Forest Genetic Resources Project.39
Tentative recognition of the problem has not afforded the
trees any greater protection however. In Aural and other
forest areas, corruption within the Forest Administration
and other institutions ensures that they continue to be
logged intensively. 
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however, the huge difference in availability of the wood
and its price – hundreds of dollars more per m3 – gives
the luxury wood trade a distinct profile.
In the context of a ban on commercial harvesting of
wood in Cambodia, illegal logging has increasingly
focused on luxury tree species. Even small quantities of
rare wood can generate very high returns and the lower
volumes involved make it much easier to cut, transport
and sell without detection. At the same time, the
demand for these woods, both within Cambodia and in
the region, is on the rise. Accounts from timber dealers
in the southwest and other parts of Cambodia suggests
that large quantities are being transported to China,
another country which has pledged to implement the
2001 FLEG agreement, via Vietnam.32
These factors have encouraged the involvement in the
rare wood trade of high-ranking government officials
and elements of the military – the same groups that
dominate other lucrative sectors of Cambodia’s black
economy, such as the trafficking of fuel, drugs and
people. The other main players are large wood
businesses that specialise in the supply of luxury timber.
In Cambodia’s southwest, the trade is dominated by
RCAF and a relatively small group of businessmen and
women, who source much of the rare wood they sell
from protected areas in Kompong Speu, Koh Kong and
Pursat provinces. 
As with the trade in commercial grade wood, the
luxury timber dealers in Aural sub-contract location
and felling of trees to soldiers or civilian workers. They
often pay these groups in advance and on occasion
accompany them to the cutting site to select trees to be
felled. The valuable part of the tree is its dark-coloured
core and the logging crews often make holes in the tree
trunks to assess the core’s diameter before cutting. 
Once the trees are felled, the loggers usually cut off
and discard the pale outer wood that surrounds the
core, to leave square logs or slabs. These are
transported out of the forest by ox-carts accompanied
by armed guards, to a rendezvous point with the
timber dealer. The timber dealer then transports the
wood to depots in Kompong Speu and Phnom Penh,
or exports it directly to Vietnam. 
The trucks carrying the wood are often escorted
along the main roads by military police or soldiers in
groups of up to 60. The timber dealers do not always
use trucks, however. Currently fashionable are saloon
cars that have been converted to accommodate slabs of
wood up to two metres long.
Highly sought after luxury black wood species
such as Tumloap, are priced according to the
dimensions of the piece of timber. One dealer
informed associates that for Tumloap of diameter
15–30 cm, he would pay US$700 per m3, while a piece
of 60-85 cm diameter could command as much as
US$3,500, although trees of this size are now
extremely rare as a result of over-exploitation by
illegal loggers.40 The larger diameter pieces are more
valuable by volume because they can be fashioned into
a much wider array of products.
Tumloap cut in Aural and other areas of the
southwest is almost all initially exported to Vietnam,
where it commands exceptionally high prices. Much of
it then appears to be re-exported to China. Timber
dealers reported that the Tumloap exports were
temporarily interrupted in June however, because
Sculptures made from illegally logged Beng and Thnong luxury timber
on display at Ministry of Agriculture trade exhibition, April 2004
Ox-cart convoy loading luxury timber
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Transportation of luxury-grade timber: Tumloap
Freshly logged Beng wood
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use it to levy bribes from the perpetrators. Registering
and extorting from offenders is not unique to Aural and
Global Witness investigations have uncovered similar
systems operating in other areas of the country.44
Such practices exemplify the manner in which state
structures in Cambodia operate as vehicles for the
illegal enrichment of officials, rather than the service 
of its citizens.
Wood traders, who typically own a certain amount
of equipment themselves, are charged supplementary
fees on a monthly basis. Within Aural district,
businessmen and women are summoned to monthly
meetings by local officials, at which they are then called
upon to open their wallets. The district officials claim
that the fees collected are used to support the salaries of
civil servants and to underwrite public services, such as
construction of schools.45
Groups not permanently based in Aural – notably
special RCAF units – also send teams into the wildlife
sanctuary to extort money from loggers and sawmill
operators on a more occasional basis. The frequency
with which these fees are collected and the rate charged
varies considerably. From the perspective of the
operator, the extortion is unpredictable and usually
involves a process of negotiation.32
6.2 Levies on transportation
The same range of groups also levy fees on transports of
wood through checkpoints along tracks in the forest
and the roads leading out of Aural.
Ox-carts carrying commercial grade timber out
from the forest, for example, are required to make
payments of US$2.5, in the case of small ox-carts, and
US$5 for large ox-carts. Checkpoints targeting ox-carts
are generally manned by soldiers from Battalion 313
and the Kompong Speu Provincial Military Sub-
Operation.46 Both these units are under the command
of Military Region 3, which is headed by Major-
General Keo Samuan.
Richer pickings are offered by the truck transports
of wood leaving Aural. Taxing of trucks demands no
registration of operators and merely requires a roadside
checkpoint and some firearms. It is one of the main
draws for military and other groups that are based
outside Aural. The rates charged on trucks vary
according to the quality and quantity of the wood and
the group demanding the fees. 
A typical tariff for a small Korean-made truck, with
capacity of around 3-5 m3, is US$12.5 per load of
commercial grade sawn timber. Medium-sized vehicles
may be charged US$25 per journey and the largest
trucks, carrying around 35 m3, a higher rate still.
If the wood is luxury category, however, fees for
the same quantity are very much higher, and are
generally calculated by volume. Aural district chief
Chem Sarim, for example, takes US$20 per m3, while
the Forest Administration Mobile Task Force takes
US$50 per m3.47
6.3 Conflicts
Aural’s timber taxation regime is exacting and operators
complain of being charged as many as five times per
day. The system of informal taxation offers wood
businesses few guarantees and the fluctuating number
of groups involved makes the system arbitrary. 
However much resented, it appears that the 
systems of fee collection are well established and do not
usually generate open conflict between the operators
and the extortionists. Timber traders and loggers told
Global Witness that they did not perceive extortion by
the military and other groups as a threat to their
businesses, which remained profitable despite the 
hefty expenditure on bribes. The only groups
interviewees cited as a threat were law enforcement
teams led by international NGOs.48
An exception to this relatively harmonious picture is
the relationship between soldiers based in Aural,
notably troops from Battalion 313, and staff from the
Forest Administration. Battalion 313 troops sit at the
bottom of the pecking order of military units profiting
from the timber trade. Many are directly involved in
logging and transporting for themselves or on behalf of
others, and this brings them into conflict with the
foresters, who try to tax them.
There are also some conflicts between the different
groups collecting fees. This is most apparent in the case
of the district military police and police in Aural,
although here the friction appears to be more an
extension of a nationwide rivalry than competition over
the source of funds. 
Given the range of armed groups operating in Aural,
however, the number of clashes has been relatively
small. This most probably relates to current scale of the
timber industry and the high profits being made. Were
the trade to be suppressed, it is doubtful that it could
support the full complement of groups that currently
feed off it. Some would probably be forced to scale
back their operations or leave altogether.
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6 EXTORTION
The timber trade in Aural flourishes because it is
protected by military units and other state agencies, such
as the police. This protection comes at a price, however,
and wood traders are required to pay bribes at every stage
of the timber extraction process. Those who do not pay
are “cracked down on” – meaning that they have their
equipment and timber stocks destroyed or confiscated. 
It is not only armed agencies such as RCAF and
police units that milk the wood business, however.
Over the past year, the Forest Administration has
expanded its illegal collection of fees in and around
Aural and has quickly earned a reputation as the most
grasping and avaricious of the various groups involved. 
The district and provincial authorities are similarly
implicated, and in some instances play a quasi-
regulatory role in their registering of illegal operators. 
It is a reflection of just how well-established the illegal
industry and payments system is, that Aural now has a
shadow taxation regime built around extortion. 
The 2002 Forestry Law Article 100 categorises the
participation or complicity in forest crimes of military,
police and other agencies as a class II offence:
“Any activities carried out by local authority
officials, police officers, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
or other authorities that directly or indirectly allow
forest exploitation or other activities contrary to the
provisions of this law…shall be subject to one to five
years in prison and fines of 10 million to 100 million Riel
(US$2,500-$25,000).”
Under Article 101 of the Forestry Law, Forest
Administration staff involved in or allowing forest
crimes to take place are subject to the same penalties. 
To date, neither Article 100, nor Article 101 has ever
been enforced, despite regular public exposure of
officials and soldiers commissioning, participating in or
profiting from forest crimes. 
In this regard, it is important to emphasise that
there is no lack of awareness of the law; the issue is its
implementation. In Aural and across Cambodia, the
Forestry Law is used by Forest Administration,
police and the military as a basis for extorting
money from perpetrators of forest crimes.
The same actors often play more than one
role, moreover, and many of those officials
who demand bribes also run their own illegal
timber operations. These two sets of activities
complement each other well, as timber and
equipment which is confiscated can then be
sold or put to use as part of the confiscating
party’s own business venture.
In Aural, anyone trying to break the
timber industry is not only going up against
well-connected businesses, but also the full
spectrum of official institutions profiting
through informal taxation. The latter are much more
powerful than the businesses and in most cases they 
are armed.
The high profits that officials and RCAF personnel
generate through extortion give them as strong a stake
in the illegal timber industry as the wood traders
themselves. It is not only those present in Aural,
however, who have an interest in the industry’s survival.
Extortion in Aural and elsewhere in Cambodia, is
carried out within the parameters of patronage
networks that are ultimately controlled by senior
officials and generals in Phnom Penh. Junior
functionaries and soldiers are expected to collect bribes
and pass a high proportion of the takings up the chain
of command. In return, their superiors ensure that they
are protected from law enforcement under Articles 100
and 101 of the Forestry Law.41
6.1 Levies on machinery operators and wood
traders
Illegal taxation of the industry takes two main forms.
One is collection of fees from traders and equipment
operators, a process dominated by those agencies with a
permanent presence in Aural – Military Region 3
officers, military police, police, local government
officials and Forest Administration staff.42
The system is so well-established that some of these
groups use a register of illegal operators to keep a track
of the groups and individuals they tax, based on the
items of equipment they possess. One such register
drawn up by the Aural district authorities in December
2003 lists 96 individuals by name, sex, profession,
address, items of equipment (numbers of chainsaws and
sawmills) and zones of operation.43
This document illustrates a detailed knowledge of
criminal activities occurring in the wildlife sanctuary.
Rather than employing it as basis for suppressing
crimes, however, the district authorities and the police
‘Aural District Environment Agency Office list of Forest and Wildlife Crime
perpetrators’, dated 18 December 2003
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of Tumloap from Kantuot to Trapeang Kraleng Market
in Phnom Sruoch district on Route 4.53 This took place
two days after soldiers were observed transporting
several m3 of square-cut Tumloap logs from Tadak Pong
airfield in Sre Ambel district, Koh Kong, in the
direction of Aural, using a six-wheeled Chinese-made
military truck belonging to timber dealer Peng Ly –
almost certainly part of the same operation.54
In line with the unofficial taxation regime operating
in Aural, Battalion 313 soldiers are not required to pay
bribes to the local authorities for the right to use
chainsaws, although they do have to pay fees for the
wood that they cut.41 A copy of the register of illegal
operators held by the Aural district governor, dated 
18 December 2003, lists 14 members of Battalion 313
operating chainsaws, and three owning sawmills.43
Information from other sources suggests that these
figures substantially underestimate the number of
Battalion 313 members involved in the wood trade.55
Battalion 313 troops’ role in logging and
transporting wood within Aural brings them into
conflict with the foresters, whom the soldiers regard as
the most avaricious of the various agencies demanding
bribes. Members of Battalion 313 complain that they
have to pay the foresters for all timber, firewood,
charcoal and wildlife they take from the wildlife
sanctuary. They resent what they perceive as the
foresters enriching themselves at the expense of poor
soldiers and villagers.28
Several Battalion 313 troops interviewed, claimed
that Lieutenant-Colonel Somrith Reang is not involved
in the timber trade and that soldiers running logging
and processing operations try to prevent him hearing of
their activities. Instead, they say that they notify
Reang’s deputies, Majors Sai Vor and Chuon Chorn,
who, in exchange for money for “beer and cigarettes”
can generally be relied upon to turn a sympathetically
blind eye.28
According to colleagues, Somrith Reang believes
that his unit is being scape-goated for all forest crimes
in Aural. He is also reported to have claimed that he
will arrest any of his troops caught logging or extorting
money.28 In a document sent to local authorities, the
Forest Administration, FFI and Conservation
International on 1 June, Somrith Reang lists the names
of seven soldiers dismissed “because they did not stop
forest crimes in line with the orders and leadership of the
Commander of Brigade 31 (Brigadier-General Srun
Saroeun) and Battalion 313 (Somrith Reang)”.56
MR3 sources also report disagreements between
Somrith Reang and his superior, Colonel Sort Suy,
about the latter’s levying of fees from the timber
industry.28 Reang himself has a history of taxing
sawmills in Aural, however, which goes back to 2001, if
not earlier.57 The Military Region 3 regime demands
that its commanders collect and pass money to the
higher echelons and it seems unlikely that he would
somehow be exempted from such duties. Officers from
another RCAF unit have recently accused Somrith
Reang of collecting fees from two sawmills near Spean
Daik, although they provided few details and this
allegation has not been validated.28
Whatever his personal role in extorting money,
Somrith Reang appears to have a keen sense of his
troops’ interests with respect to issues of law
enforcement. Reang, police chief Dos Sim and district
governor Chem Sarim have all claimed that they cannot
guarantee the security of Ministry of Environment
rangers and FFI staff if they return to the wildlife
sanctuary.58 (In Cambodia, professed inability to
guarantee someone’s security often translates as a
threat.) Such a guarantee would only be forthcoming if
MoE and FFI agreed to inform the authorities and
security forces before going on patrol – i.e. provide
loggers time to conceal their activities before the
rangers’ arrival.58
7.3 Colonel Sort Suy
Colonel Sort Suy is head of the Military Region 3
committee to combat illegal logging in Aural and, as
such, plays a leading role in extorting money from the
timber industry inside the wildlife sanctuary. A former
Khmer Rouge officer, Sort Suy was given the rank of
Brigadier-General and sent to work in the MR3
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7 MILITARY REGION 3 (MR3)
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
report to the Ministry of Defence,
which is led by Co-Ministers
General (four stars) Tea Banh 
and General (four stars) Nhek 
Bun Chhay. RCAF itself is
commanded by General (four stars)
Ke Kimyan. The two deputy-
commanders are General (four stars) Pol Saroeun and
General (four stars) Meas Sophea.
The Cambodian army’s devotion to black economy
business ventures and extortion has been established since
the early 1980s.49 Since the end of the civil war in 1998,
income generation has become its principal raison d’etre. 
Cambodian soldiers’ pay is woefully inadequate,
however the large-scale illegal logging operations in
which many take part are not geared towards their
subsistence needs. Conversely, they are a function of
well-established patron-client relationships dedicated to
filling the pockets of the generals. This patronage
system, which more or less corresponds to RCAF’s
command structure, requires troops to participate in
criminal activities in order to profit their commanders.
Its effectiveness as a money-making system is illustrated
by senior officers’ conspicuous expenditure on fleets of
Toyota Landcruisers and Phnom Penh real estate.
Military Region 3 (MR3) encompasses six provinces
and administrative units in southwestern Cambodia:
Takeo, Kampot, Kep, Sihanoukville, Kompong Speu
and Koh Kong. Its structure and portfolio of activities
exemplify the role that RCAF plays in forest crime
across Cambodia.
7.1 Command structure and revenue collection
Military Region 3 Commander Keo Samuan is a two
star major-general, who previously worked as a
secretary to Prime Minister Hun Sen. His immediate
subordinates are the four deputy commanders who
make up the MR3 General Staff committee: Brigadier-
Generals Bun Som (logistics), Kong Bunthan
(administration), Som Naren (training) and former
Khmer Rouge commander Keo Pong (combat
operations). All are based at the MR3 base in Chbar
Morn, near Kompong Speu town. Another Brigadier-
General who is not on the Military Region 3 General
Staff committee is Srun Saroeun, whose Brigade 31 is
responsible for special operations across MR3. Brigade
31 is based in Srai Khlong on Route 4.
The main duties of these senior commanders
concern fundraising for MR3. Fundraising activities
follow an irregular pattern set by requests from Keo
Samuan for money for “parties” and “meetings”.50
These requests are more frequent during the dry season
when MR3 is particularly active in illegal logging and
other business activities. Revenue from logging
operations and extraction of bribes from wood traders
forms a major part of the MR3 income.50
Under the 2002 Forestry Law Article 78, military
units are charged with assisting in enforcement
operations against forest crimes. Such operations are
generally treated as an extension of RCAF’s usual
pattern of extortion. In early June 2004, following a
speech by Prime Minister Hun Sen calling for the
suppression of forest crimes, Kompong Speu authorities
and MR3 organised a “crackdown operation” in Aural.
A report from the area summarised this as follows:
“The crackdown force of Kompong Speu soldiers 
not only took time to crack down, but also used their
own sawmills to process timber… soldiers of Military
Region 3 cracked down, asked for money from
businessmen, and used their own sawmills to process the
confiscated timber.”51
As in other Military Regions, MR3 is split into
different sectors in which particular commanders take the
lead in collecting money. Aural Wildlife Sanctuary
straddles two such zones, one of which is controlled by
Brigadier-General Srun Saroeun, commander of Brigade
31, and the other by Colonel Sort Suy, who is deputy to
the Military Region 3 General Staff.52 Although the
delineation between the two is not precise, it approximates
to a line running northwest to southeast; between Phnom
Kravanh in Pursat province and Kantuot village, at the
southern end of Aural Wildlife Sanctuary. Areas west of
this line are under the sway of Srun Saroeun, with Sort
Suy overseeing the territory to the east. Srun Saroeun is
the more powerful of the two and is able to send troops
into Sort Suy’s zone; conversely, Sort Suy’s influence ends
at the border with Srun Saroeun’s zone.52
7.2 Battalion 313
Battalion 313, based in Kantuot, inside Aural Wildlife
Sanctuary, comprises former Khmer Rouge soldiers of
Khmer Rouge Battalion 37. Although the commander of
Battalion 313, Lieutenant-Colonel Somrith Reang, asserts
that his troops are responsible for security in Aural, their
main function is in fact servicing the timber industry.46
Soldiers from Battalion 313 are major suppliers of
timber to the wood businesses based in Aural; cutting
trees in the forest and then transporting them out by
ox-cart. Aside from extracting wood that they have cut
themselves, Battalion 313 soldiers also escort cartloads
of timber out of the forest on behalf of the timber
businesses. The presence of soldiers helps to reduce the
amount the ox-cart drivers have to pay to checkpoints
along the way, which, not infrequently, are manned by
other members of Battalion 313.38
Battalion 313 troops also provide armed escorts to
larger vehicles carrying timber out of Aural. On May 31
2004, a group of around 60 soldiers from Battalion 313
accompanied three trucks carrying approximately 10 m3 Soldiers escorting truckload of Tumloap luxury timber, May 2004
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sway and they periodically set up checkpoints along
Route 42 between Kantuot and Route 4.38
Brigade 14 is active in illegal logging across the
southwest and in May 2004, Srun Saroeun was reported to
be orchestrating logging operations in Koh Kong province;
notably Kamlot, Trapeang Rung, Andoung Teuk and
Chhay Reap.50 On 26 May, he organised the transportation
of a quantity of Kranhung and Tumloap luxury wood
from Sre Ambel, Koh Kong province, in co-operation with
timber traders Peng Ly, Veng I and Veng II. 
Some of this wood was assembled into a raft and
towed by boat to a rendezvous point near Dong Tong,
close to the border with Thailand. Simultaneously, two
small Korean-made trucks transported 9-10 m3 between
them from Sre Ambel to Phnom Penh along Route 4. In
Kompong Speu town the trucks stopped at Peng Ly’s
house, where they were joined by three Toyota Camry
saloon cars each carrying 0.5 m3 of Tumloap.61 From
here the vehicles continued as a convoy to Phnom Penh
where they delivered the wood to luxury timber shops
located in the Boeung Trabek area of the city. The price
of the timber was reported to be US$950 per m3.61
Srun Saroeun commands altogether 1,800 soldiers,
who are based in Koh Kong, Trapeang Rung, Andoung
Teuk, Koh Slar, Kampong Saom and Aural. Outside
Aural, he has business interests in all six provinces
within MR3 except Takeo, and he controls illegal
transports of goods along the length of Route 4 from his
base in Srai Khlong. In this capacity, Srun Saroeun was
previously a pivotal figure in the Route 4 wildlife trade,
however he has reportedly scaled back these activities in
response to pressure from Prime Minister Hun Sen.50
Much earlier in his career, Srun Saroeun served as a
bodyguard to Hun Sen and spent extended periods
studying in Vietnam. He is a friend of military
intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Mol Roeup and a
contemporary of military police commander
Lieutenant-General Sao Sokha, with whom he
maintains close relations.50 During the late 1980s and
early 1990s, Srun Saroeun was a member of one of the
so-called A teams – elite counter-insurgency forces set
up by the Ministry of Interior. These groups were
tasked with special combat operations and harassment
of opposition politicians, up until their dissolution in
1994. Srun Saroeun’s unit, A-3, was responsible for
activities in Kompong Speu and along Route 4.62
In 1993, Srun Saroeun was transferred from RCAF
headquarters in Cham Chao, to Chbar Morn in
Kompong Speu. He became actively involved in the
illegal logging business around about 1995. During the
mid 1990s, he developed a close association with
General Pol Saroeun, and also found favour with other
senior figures in the RCAF command through his role
in brokering land deals. Srun Saroeun provided parcels
of forested land to Lieutenant-General Moeng Samphan,
whose son is married to Hun Sen’s daughter, in
Chamkar Kor in Kompong Speu in 2000. He also
obtained forestland for Generals Pol Saroeun, 
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headquarters at Chbar Morn following his defection in
the mid 1990s. Fellow RCAF officers claim that he
subsequently requested demotion and transfer back to
Aural in order to cream off a share of the profits from
the timber trade.50
Sort Suy controls a zone of informal taxation
covering the northern and eastern parts of Aural
Wildlife Sanctuary, abutting the sector dominated by
Srun Saroeun. Sort Suy’s area thus encompasses the
main centres of Aural’s downstream timber industry in
Spean Daik and Kantuot as well as roads that carry the
timber to destinations east of the wildlife sanctuary.52
Aside from extracting money from the timber trade,
Sort Suy’s main preoccupations are drinking and
karaoke. These interests are interlinked and residents of
Aural report that the Sort Suy taxation regime is at its
most exacting ahead of one of the Colonel’s frequent
parties. Sort Suy often demands that payments are made
to him in quantities of beer or petrol, rather than cash.52
Some reports suggest that Sort Suy’s persistent
intoxication makes him a less efficient taxman than some
of his peers. Nonetheless, the Colonel extracted maximum
advantage from the 15-day military crackdown on forest
crimes at the start of June; local sources reporting “Sort
Suy spent his time cracking down by asking for money
from the ox-cart and sawmill owners”.51
Although concentrating on collecting fees from the
wood trade, Sort Suy has recently started his own
business transporting charcoal from Aural to Kompong
Speu, using a pair of blue three ton Korean trucks.28
7.4 Veng II
Sort Suy subcontracts the collection of fees to two
civilians named Voeun and Veng II. Veng II’s brother,
Veng I, runs an illegal timber business out of Sre Ambel
in Koh Kong. His other brother is Kompong Speu
wood trader Peng Ly. Veng II owns his own sawmill
and co-operates on luxury timber deals with his
brothers. He also extorts money from other sawmill
owners around Kantuot and Sangke Sartob commune.
Most of this he passes to Sort Suy, although he
occasionally collects bribes on behalf of military police
commander Saom Puthdara, district police chief Dos
Sim and district governor Chem Sarim as well.59 Sort
Suy generally calls on Veng II’s fund-raising capabilities
when he needs money for a party.38
7.5 Voeun
Voeun was previously a member of Battalion 313, but
demobilised some years ago. He likes to give the
impression that he is still on active service, however,
and usually wears an RCAF uniform, which he admits
having purchased at the military market in Phnom
Penh. Voeun operates as a tax farmer on behalf of Sort
Suy and collects fees in Trapeang Chou commune and
areas close to Aural Mountain.52
Reports from Spean Daik identify Voeun as the most
active fee-collector for the military in the area. He works
through a series of checkpoints and pays soldiers to
collect money on his behalf.28 Ox-carts are charged US$5
each time they are intercepted by soldiers working for
Voeun. On the same basis, Voeun collects a share of the
bribes paid by truck drivers at military checkpoints.50
Voeun also levies fees from sawmills and chainsaw
owners on a regular basis, usually demanding sums of
US$100 and US$25 respectively. Those who do not pay
can expect to have their equipment confiscated or
destroyed. Voeun provides loggers and sawmill
operators with the two-way radio frequency 14333 that
he uses and gives them advance warning of any law
enforcement operations.38
One of Voeun’s key associates is a former soldier
based in Kompong Speu town, whose name is Hai. Hai
left Battalion 313 three years ago, but continues to 
wear his military uniform. It is not clear whether Hai 
is still a member of any regular RCAF unit; however he
is often seen with Chan Chao, head of the RCAF
military intelligence unit responsible for extorting
money in Aural.60
Voeun and Hai regularly transport illegally logged
luxury wood out of Aural in the latter’s Toyota Camry
saloon car, which has been customised to carry pieces of
timber up to two metres long. The two men were
stopped by Ministry of Environment rangers in Spean
Daik on suspicion of carrying Beng wood in Hai’s car on
the night of 19 March 2004. The rangers claim that Hai
and Voeun threatened them and said that they would
return to “test (the rangers’) strength”.37 Later that
evening the rangers’ checkpoint was attacked by around
60 people associated with the Aural timber industry. 
7.6 Brigadier-General Srun Saroeun
Brigadier-General Srun Saroeun, the commander of
Brigade 31, is a key player in the timber industry on the
western side of Aural Wildlife Sanctuary, exercising
control over a zone that extends into the former
Superwood and Samling timber concessions. This area’s
eastern extent is Spean Daik and Kantuot. Some reports
suggest that the boundary of Srun Saroeun’s zone is
defined by the Steung Prey Thnaot stream flowing
south out of the Aural Mountain complex. Srun
Saroeun is one of the most powerful commanders in
MR3, however, and in practice this boundary does not
place any definitive limit on his influence.52
In Aural, soldiers commanded by Srun Saroeun
engage in the standard pattern of logging, protection of
timber transports and collection of fees through
checkpoints. They are particularly active in the western
half of the wildlife sanctuary, including areas inside
Pursat province and Military Region 5.46 In 2004, Brigade
31 troops have provided protection for four sawmills
belonging to timber businessman Eng Youry. These
sawmills have been operating in the Pursat part of Aural,
close to the wildlife sanctuary’s northern and western
boundaries. Srun Saroeun’s soldiers are also active in
areas of Aural where Colonel Sort Suy nominally holds
General Pol Saroeun, Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, RCAF
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Lt-General Moeng Samphan,
Head of RCAF Procurement
Department
General Ke Kimyan,
Commander-in-Chief, RCAF
General Meas Sophea, Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, RCAF
Logging operation by members of Brigade 31
Ke Kimyan and Meas Sophea along Route 4 close to
Pich Nil, as well as locations near Sre Ambel and
Kompong Saom.50 Srun Saroeun continues to cultivate
Pol Saroeun and Moeng Samphan as patrons and
presents them with expensive gifts several times a year.50
Srun Saroeun’s CPP-controlled Battalion 44 (now
re-named Brigade 31) was involved in heavy fighting
with Funcinpec troops commanded by Nhek Bun
Chhay in the Thai border area of Thmar Da following
the CPP coup in July 1997. His troops are alleged to
have murdered several Funcinpec military commanders
around this time.63 Srun Saroeun also stands accused of
a series of kidnappings of ethnic Chinese businessmen
in the late 1990s.50
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involved in an armed confrontation with the In
Sokhear group, which came close to erupting into a
firefight.50 Following this series of setbacks, Kong
Bunthan’s influence appears to have been significantly
reduced and he reportedly spends increasing amounts
of time away from MR3 headquarters, tending
chickens at his house near Chbar Morn.50
7.10 Brigadier-General Keo Pong
Keo Pong was a senior Khmer Rouge commander in
the southwest until he joined the government side in
1995. During the civil war he directed operations
from his base in Kantuot. Already a major player in
illegal logging prior to his defection, Keo Pong
continued to broker logging deals in the area. In
1996, he began separate negotiations with Korean and
Taiwanese companies to provide them with logging
concessions inside the wildlife sanctuary.50 According
to MR3 colleagues, when representatives of these two
companies arrived to close their deals and make
initial payments, Keo Pong murdered them and kept
the money.50
Keo Pong serves as one of the four deputy
commanders of Military Region 3 and was recently
transferred from a base in Koh Kong to Chbar Morn.
He remains instrumental in illegal logging deals in the
southwest and is one of the main revenue collectors for
MR3.50 Keo Pong retains his ties with Aural, where he
enjoys playing the role of local benefactor: promising
money for schools and pagodas and periodically visiting
to donate rice, sarongs, and cash to villagers. His
business ventures in the area include cassava plantations
along Route 42.29
7.11 Major Tep Sambath, Kompong Speu Provincial
Military Sub-Operation
The Kompong Speu Provincial Military Sub-Operation
is under the command of Men Nim, and has around
1,000 troops based in seven locations in Kompong
Speu province. One of these detachments is stationed
in Aural district, close to Kantuot, under the command
of Mr Sokhon. Two members of this group are
recorded as chainsaw operators by the Aural district
authorities in their register of illegal operators dated
December 2003.43
However, it is troops based in Kompong Speu town
under the command of Tep Sambath and Men Vey who
take the lead in collecting bribes in Aural. Tep Sambath
works on behalf of Keo Samuan’s secretary, In Sokhear,
but also pays a share of the fees he collects to Men Nim.
Provincial Military Sub-Operation troops commanded
by Tep Sambath are reported to have become
increasingly active in Aural over recent months –
logging and transporting timber and operating
checkpoints in the forest.64
Within Aural, the Tep Sambath group is known by
Sambath’s radio call sign, number 22. Men Nim’s call
sign is number 19.61
7.12 Military Development Zone
RCAF effectively became the
largest land concession holder
in Cambodia after the
government granted it control
over 700,000 hectares of so called
Military Development Zone land
in the early 1990s. The nature of this
agreement has never been disclosed and even the
location of the different areas that comprise the
700,000 plus hectares has not been made public.6
The existence of the Military Development Zones
has serious implications for Cambodians living in
these areas, who, in the absence of information
about the zones’ legal status, have limited scope for
holding the military and the government to account.
The secrecy that surrounds the entire scheme
typifies the lack of transparency that blights efforts
to reform forest and land management in Cambodia.
Given RCAF’s track record of illegal logging, the
allocation of Military Development Zones is likely
to represent a death sentence for forests that fall
within their boundaries. 
In Aural, around 70 MR3 troops and their families
have begun establishing what they claim is as a
Military Development Zone northwest of Kantuot
village, well inside the boundaries of the wildlife
sanctuary. Some of these soldiers are operating as
guards for the Chinese New Cosmos company which
has a contract with the government to construct a golf
course and theme park around the hot springs at Te
Teuk Phos.46 The New Cosmos contract has been
awarded in violation of the 1993 Sub-Decree on
Protected Areas and the 1994 Ministerial Decision on
Protected Areas. The Military Development Zone
troops claim that they are acting on orders from Keo
Samuan, however, they have signed an agreement with
New Cosmos and appear to be being paid by the
company.50 Military Development Zone troops are
also active in logging operations in Aural.65
The officer responsible for the 700,000 hectares of
RCAF Military Development Zone land spread across
Cambodia is Uk Kousar, the former chief of logistics
for MR3. According to RCAF officers, Uk Kousar
secured the Military Development Zone position after
giving a large amount of money to the wife of General
Meas Sophea in 1998. Meas Sophea subsequently wrote
to Keo Samuan and other senior RCAF officers,
informing them of Uk Kousar’s appointment.50 Uk
Kousar is now based in Phnom Penh, but still has a
house in Kompong Speu.50
The status of the Military Development Zone in
Aural remains unclear. In March, General Meas 
Sophea announced that troops would be removed from
the wildlife sanctuary, however the Military
Development Zone remains and there has apparently
been no reduction in the number of RCAF troops on
the ground.66
Part Two – Key Players/Military Region 3 (MR3)
TAKING A CUT25
7.7 Major-General Keo Samuan
Major-General Keo Samuan sits at the apex of the
Military Region 3 revenue collection system. As such, he
does not often get directly involved in logging deals
himself, however he oversees the patronage system
which drives them. Keo Samuan’s demands for payments
take the form of requests for money for “parties” and
“meetings”. These are passed to the MR3 deputy
commanders through his secretary, Major In Sokhear.50
In Sokhear finds it prudent to stay on good terms
with Keo Samuan’s wife and keeps her informed as to the
sums the Major-General is expecting to receive. Mrs Keo
Samuan usually claims around half of each tranche and
ensures that her share is diverted before the cash reaches
her husband. She is also known and feared within the
MR3 officer corps for the control she exercises over their
career development. Officers seeking promotion often
find their prospects improve following representations
and generous offerings to Mrs Keo Samuan.50
In addition to receiving funds generated by the
regional networks of the deputy commanders, Keo
Samuan also benefits from the informal taxation system
run by In Sokhear, who targets luxury wood traders in
the southwest, including Aural.50
7.8 Major In Sokhear
As Major-General Keo Samuan’s secretary, In Sokhear
is a key broker in the MR3 patronage system. He
exploits this role for personal advantage as much as the
enrichment of his boss and extorts large sums from
traders such as Peng Ly, Peng Leang, Yeay Bong and
Veng I. In Sokhear is known within the southwest as a
“strongman”, who does not hesitate to suppress the
activities of those that refuse to pay him off. This
ruthlessness is exemplified by his recent efforts to take
over the timber business run by deputy commander of
MR3, Brigadier-General Kong Bunthan. 50
In Aural, In Sokhear delegates fee collection duties
to Tep Sambath, of the Kompong Speu Provincial
Military Sub-Operation, based in Kompong Speu.50
In Sokhear claims that the money he collects is for
Keo Samuan, however most he keeps for himself. In
Kirirom National Park, to the south of Aural, he
charges timber dealers US$50 for each m3 of luxury
timber they transport and MR3 sources estimate that
this alone earns him around US$3,000 per month.50
While his combined earnings are not known, they are
evidently sufficient to cover his recent purchases of a
new house and a luxury car.50 
7.9 Brigadier-General Kong Bunthan
Kong Bunthan was previously a member of the
Military Region 3 committee charged with
suppressing illegal logging in the southwest of
Cambodia. In common with other members of this
committee, notably Sort Suy, Kong Bunthan appears
to have interpreted this office as licence to extort
money from loggers. At the same time, he continued
to run his own business illegally cutting luxury timber
species in Kirirom National Park and parts of Koh
Kong province.61
Those timber traders Kong Bunthan works most
closely with include Peng Ly, Peng Leang, Mr Nee
(Military Sub-Operation, Kompong Speu), and Mr
Puon (RCAF tank regiment, based in Phnom Sruoch on
Route 4).61 Others reportedly connected with Kong
Bunthan include Ta Kreum, Khong Thong, Mr Pove
(Military Sub-Operation, Kompong Speu) and MR3
officer Sim Hor, who is known as “Ta 100”.50
Kong Bunthan was formerly a key link in the 
MR3 upward chain of illegal payments and known 
to siphon off a substantial portion for himself.
However, his timber business has fallen on hard 
times in recent months, following a turf war with 
In Sokhear, and his capacity to collect money also
appears to have diminished.50
In early 2004, Kong Bunthan was despatched on a
training course in Vietnam for three months. Taking
advantage of his absence, In Sokhear, in cooperation
with Ta Nang of the Forest Administration Mobile Task
Force, sought to take over his
business. Between 17-18 April, 
In Sokhear’s troops and the FA
Mobile Task Force seized Beng
and Kranhung wood from soldiers
under Kong Bunthan’s command
who were transporting it from
Kirirom to Kompong Speu. In
Sokhear and Ta Nang
subsequently sold the seized
timber to businessman Peng Ly.61
Upon his return from
Vietnam around one week later,
Kong Bunthan unsuccessfully
sought the intervention, on his
behalf, of Military Region 3
commander Keo Samuan.
Meanwhile, his troops becameMilitary vehicle used for timber transports
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9.2 RCAF Military Intelligence Division
The opportunities to extort money from the wood
trade in Aural have attracted the attentions of soldiers
from the RCAF military intelligence division. Troops
reporting to military intelligence chief Lieutenant-
General Mol Roeup, who has recently been promoted
to the rank of RCAF Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, are
regularly seen in Aural, collecting money through
checkpoints. The Mol Roeup group works in
cooperation with soldiers answerable to another
powerful military intelligence officer, Lieutenant-
General Dom Hak.50 Though not especially numerous,
these military intelligence operatives are regarded by
locals with a certain amount of fear and have reputation
for demanding higher payments than other
extortionists.65
The military intelligence group operating in
Aural consists of Chan Chao, Voeun (not the same
Voeun who works with Sort Suy), Kat, Pros,
Khoeurn, Nhanh and Tuo. They form part of a
regional unit, which also extorts money in other
areas of Kompong Speu and Pursat. The seven are
regularly seen dining in Spean Daik, wearing military
uniform and carrying weapons.68
In addition to collecting fees, they also run their
own timber business. Local residents report that they
often place orders for luxury timber with loggers and
then transport the wood to Kompong Speu town in two
Toyota Hilux pickup trucks (one red, one blue, both
bearing military plates). They also use a white Toyota
Camry saloon car which has civilian number plates.29
The Mol Roeup-Dom Hak group is also reported to be
involved in buying and selling wildlife in Aural and
Thpong districts.29
One member of the group, Kat, lives in Sok Veng
village, Trapeang Chou commune and is a timber
businessman in his own right, operating two sawmills.
His name features in the Aural district authorities’
register of illegal operators compiled in December 2003,
listed as “Dom Hak agent”. The others are based
outside the area. The senior officer in the group is Chan
Chao, who is an associate of Mr Hai, the former
Battalion 313 officer who transports luxury timber.50
Units under Lieutenant-General Dom Hak’s
command are reported to be involved in illegal activities
elsewhere in Military Region 3, notably smuggling
operations through Sre Ambel port in Koh Kong.50
Dom Hak himself was arrested in October 2003 on
suspicion of drug trafficking, following the seizure of
35kg of heroin in Phnom Penh. He was released shortly
afterwards, because, in the words of co-Minister of
Defence Tea Banh, “the investigation found no
evidence”. Police officers familiar with the case offered
a different explanation however: 
“the top leaders have already made negotiations…
Even if we find something new and the leaders have
already reached a compromise, the person (police) who
takes action will be the person who gets in trouble”.69
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8 MILITARY REGION 5 (MR5)
The northwestern part of the wildlife sanctuary and a
substantial portion of the Aural Mountain complex itself
fall within Pursat province and Military Region 5 (MR5).
A range of MR5-based units are active in taxing timber
transports through checkpoints on the tracks running
southwest from Bamnak to the wildlife sanctuary,
notably in the vicinity of Reang Khvav village.30 
8.1 Brigade 14
Brigade 14, which is commanded by Brigadier-General
Thoung Prasat, has its headquarters near Chamkiet
village, Krakor district. Although located in Region 5,
the unit is under the central command of RCAF
headquarters, Phnom Penh. Mr Reth, the deputy
commander of Brigade 14, organises protection for
some of the large sawmills operating near the northern
border of Aural Wildlife Sanctuary, as well as others
elsewhere in Pursat. These activities continue, but have
been scaled back since the start of the 2004 rainy season.61
Brigade 14 also protects timber transports for
luxury wood trader Suos Ky Reth, who is based in
Pursat. Suos Ky Reth cooperates with Youry Saco
company owner Eng Youry in transporting and
exporting luxury wood cut in Pursat, Koh Kong and
Kompong Thom.61
8.2 Pursat Provincial Military Sub-Operation
In early 2004, Soldiers from the Pursat Provincial
Military Sub-Operation, as well as Brigade 14 and 
other units, were operating a checkpoint near Reang
Khvav village, at which they were taking bribes of
US$5-US$6.25 from each ox-cart they caught
transporting timber.50
9 OTHER MILITARY UNITS
9.1 Division 1, Kompong Chhnang
Division 1, another unit that reports directly to the
central army command in Phnom Penh, has its main
base at Long Vek, Kompong Chhnang province. An
investigation unit of Division 1 troops, who wear a
distinctive tiger motif badge on their uniforms,
periodically establish checkpoints in Aural as a means
of extorting money from illegal timber transports. Their
main zone of operation is in the vicinity of Che’en and
Aural villages.50 
In late May, troops from unit Ngyor Pii based in
Long Vek, set up timber-tax checkpoints in O’Taung,
Longem and Aural villages in the centre of the wildlife
sanctuary.67
A key player in Division 1 logging activities is
General Prum Pheng, who has been involved in the
illegal logging business over several years.57 Division 1
officers who own sawmills in the Aural area include Ly,
Kheng, Chourn and Vuth.30
RCAF parade ground, Phnom Penh
Headquarters of Division 1, Long Vek, Kompong Chhnang province
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Timber truck impounded by military police during ‘crackdown’ operation
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so-called because of his well-established role in
procuring luxury wood for Sao Sokha.61
Saom Puthdara also offers protection services
to other timber traders, such as Yeay Bong, Peng
Ly and Phnom Sruoch military police officer
Peng Leang. In mid May, for example, he
provided armed escort for ox-carts carrying 4 m3
of Tumloap for Peng Ly, which was cut in forest
close to Samraong village.71
Once extracted from the forest, the MPs, often
operating in groups of six to seven, then supervise
the loading of the timber into small trucks, which
they accompany out of Aural to ward off the
attentions of Forest Administration checkpoints.50
In May 2004 these luxury timber transports
brought the MPs into conflict with the district
police – Aural police chief Dos Sim taking offence at
the way in which the MPs were moving truckloads of
luxury wood past his office in Kantuot without paying
him any money. In response, police embarked on a
round of confiscations targeting military police-
protected convoys and seized luxury timber from
groups of MPs on 25 and 28 May.73
Indicative of the extent to which their day-to-day
operations revolve around the illegal timber trade, is the
fact that the Aural MPs have their own sawmill in their
compound in Kantuot. Saom Puthdara’s deputy, Nop
Thorn, meanwhile, runs his own separate timber
business on the side.46
The Aural MPs also
find time to extort money
from sawmills around the
wildlife sanctuary. Their
regular targets include two
sawmills near Kantuot and
three close to Ta Sal. Saom
Puthdara periodically sends
teams to sawmills out in the
forest, to demand bribes of US$100-150 per sawmill per
visitation. In June, sources close to the Aural military
police reported that he was brokering the establishment
of six to seven new mills around Kantuot.50
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Aside from Mao and Maorng, other B-70 members
operating in Aural include two soldiers called Ly and
Pros. Ly claims he was sent to the area to investigate the
violent confrontations between rangers and timber
trade workers over the weekend of 19-21 March 2004.
Neither Ly nor Pros appear to be based in Aural on a
permanent basis and it is not known if they are involved
in the timber trade.71
9.4 Military Police
The military police occupy a
central role in the illegal timber
trade in Aural. Their activities
include buying and selling of
luxury grade wood, extraction of
bribes from other operators,
operating a sawmill behind their office
and protecting transports of luxury timber out of Aural.
These activities are directed by Aural district MP
Commander Saom Puthdara.
The MPs’ luxury timber dealings in some respects
run much like those of their civilian counterparts, with
the MPs commissioning loggers to go to the forest and
cut rare tree species, especially Tumloap. A notable
difference, however, is the way that the MPs
supplement this source with the quantities of luxury
wood that they confiscate from local villagers.72
Aural MPs essentially operate a local branch of the
nation-wide luxury timber business run by military
police chief Lieutenant-General Sao Sokha. In the first
half of 2004, wood that the MPs bought or stole in Aural
was being sent to Phnom Penh, passed off as construction
materials for a new house for Sao Sokha, and then
diverted to timber traders elsewhere in the city.70
In early April 2004, Global Witness received reports of
Aural military police Deputy Commander Nop Thorn and
provincial Deputy Commander Men Sibon arranging the
transportation of 200 m3 of luxury timber to Phnom Penh
for Sao Sokha.50 In the same month, investigators observed
a truck belonging to Sao Sokha,
transporting luxury timber from his
house to furniture shops in Phnom
Penh’s Boeung Trabek district. It is
not certain that this wood came from
Aural, as it is equally likely to have
originated from one of the several
other provinces from which 
Sao Sokha sources illegally logged
luxury wood.70
The principal focus of the Aural
MPs, however, is protecting luxury
timber transports: both ox-carts
extracting wood from the forest and
trucks transporting timber to
Kompong Speu and Phnom Penh.
The MPs frequently cooperate in
these activities with luxury timber
traders, notably ‘Sao’ Sokhoeurn –
9.3 Hun Sen’s Bodyguard Unit B-70
Members of Hun Sen’s 1,000
strong bodyguard unit,
commanded by Major-
General Hing Bun Heang,
are active participants in the
illegal timber trade in Aural.
B-70 soldiers come to the
area to purchase timber,
which they then transport to
Phnom Penh and Vietnam.
The principal organisers of
these transports are B-70
officers Colonel Mao and
Colonel Maorng. Mao and
Maorng come to collect
timber from Aural on
average once or twice a week.46 Mao owns 15 trucks
and is known to be one of the major illegal timber
transporters in Cambodia.70
Mao and Maorng usually take timber from Aural to
Kompong Speu town in pickups or small trucks, before
loading it into two larger Hyundai vehicles capable of
carrying up to 35 m3 each.70 RCAF officers report that
the owner of one of these Hyundai trucks is B-70
officer Brigadier-General Mao Sophann and that the
other belongs to national chief of the military police,
Lieutenant-General Sao Sokha.50
Maorng and Mao figure in timber deals across the
southwest, focusing on transport of illegally sourced
timber up Route 4. In addition to sourcing wood from
Aural, they have recently been transporting sawn
timber illegally logged in the former Samling concession
in Koh Kong. This timber is being processed in the
Samling compound near Sre Ambel by soldiers of
Battalion 314.30
Mao and Maorng typically pay bribes totalling
US$1,000 per journey to the Forest Administration
Mobile Task force headed by Roath Sovannara.50
Phnom, Penh, April 2004: plainclothes military police officers transporting timber from the house of 
Lt-General Sao Sokha to furniture shops in Boeung Trabek
House of Lt-General Sao Sokha, Phnom Penh
Lt-General Sao Sokha,
Commander, Military Police
Major-General Hing Bun
Heang, Commander, 
Hun Sen’s bodyguard 
unit B-70 
Kantuot, May 2004: members of B-70 loading timber into one of their pickups
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10 FOREST ADMINISTRATION
2002 Forestry Law, article 101: 
“The following activities shall be
regarded as forestry offences
committed by a Forestry
Administration Official and shall
be subject to one to five years in
prison and fines of 10 million to 
100 million riel (US$2500-US$25,000):
● Grant authorisation contrary to the provisions 
of this law
● Entirely or partially participate directly in any
forest exploitation activity contrary to the
provisions of this law
● Allow any forestry offence
● Conducting any business related to the forestry
sector either as a sole owner, a shareholder, an
employee or a guarantor for others, while in a
position or within one year after quitting the
position for any reason
● Failure to report or failure to timely file for a
class 1 forestry offence occurring in his/her
responsible territory
● Intentionally neglect duties during a mission or
provide the false written report that allowed the
commission of a class 1
forestry offence”
Known by the name
Department of Forestry
and Wildlife up until its
restructuring in 2003,
the Forest
Administration is a
semi-autonomous unit
within the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries headed by
Minister Chan Sarun.
Chan Sarun has close
connections with the
timber mafia through
his brother-in-law, the logging subcontractor Khun
Thong.75 Khun Thong is also the father-in-law of
Forestry Administration Director Ty Sokhun. 
Although the presence of the Forest Administration
in Aural is not as pervasive as that of the military, the
FA has expanded its activities in the wildlife sanctuary
significantly since its internal reorganisation in 2003.
FA staff’s devotion to extorting money from wood
traders, rather than enforcing the Forestry Law, is
undoubtedly an important factor in the recent
expansion of Aural’s timber industry. According to
foresters working in other areas of Cambodia, FA
senior management have ordered all staff to encourage
illegal logging and then extort money from the
perpetrators.5 Such a policy would go some way
towards explaining the FA’s activities in Aural, which
encompass extortion and illegal timber deals.
Accounts from workers and residents in Aural
indicate that the foresters are in many cases the
greediest of the various agencies demanding fees. Their
grasping approach has raised the stakes in an already
crowded field and has prompted an overall escalation in
the level of bribes being demanded. 76
Foresters have reportedly capitalised on the recent
Forest Administration restructuring – which has
introduced additional layers of administration – to double
charge the timber trade. FA checkpoints now demand two
sets of bribes: one for the triage level FA and one for the
division level. Each takes US$50 per m3 of luxury timber
and smaller sums for commercial grade wood.32
FA staff’s aggressive behaviour has brought them
into conflict with members of the military on at least
two occasions in recent months. One dispute, reported
to Global Witness in early April 2004, related to
foresters’ confiscation of chainsaws from Military
Region 3 personnel near Spean Daik. After seizing the
equipment, the foresters set about selling it at US$100
per saw. The soldiers returned to confront the
foresters and shots were fired, although reportedly no
one was injured.29
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According to sources within the military police, the
proceeds of these timber deals and extortion activities
are fed upwards through the national chain of
command. In the first instance, money is passed to
Kompong Speu military police Deputy Commander
Men Sibon, who in turn sends it to national military
police chief Sao Sokha. Some estimates put the military
police’s monthly takings from the Aural timber
industry at US$3000-US$4000.50
Saom Puthdara exercises a tight grip over MPs’
revenue collection within Aural. Officers lining their
own pockets with bribes extracted from sawmills tend
to get caught out, because Saom Puthdara conducts his
own checks to see whether the timber businesses have
all paid or not.50 Saom Puthdara, meanwhile, seeks to
give the impression that he is passing 100% of the
money on to Men Sibon in Kompong Speu. In practice,
however, he often omits to report the establishment of
new sawmills to Men Sibon and keeps the bribes
extracted from these new operations for himself. Such
was the case when two new illegal sawmills were set up
in Sangke Sartob commune in April 2004.50
Saom Puthdara’s failure to provide his subordinates
with what they perceive as a fair share of the spoils has
bred considerable resentment within the ranks. Aural
MPs have complained to colleagues at the way they are
required to do all the dirty work in terms of extorting
money and transporting timber, while receiving no
recognition or reward in return. Saom Puthdara, by
contrast, has somehow managed to put aside sufficient
savings to permit the recent acquisition of a new car.50
Matters came to a head in May, when 10 of the 12
district MPs submitted to Men Sibon a thumb-printed
petition requesting that Saom Puthdara be removed
from his position. The document claimed that Saom
Puthdara was failing to provide the MPs with sufficient
funds to survive and that they did not even have enough
money to buy food.50 Men Sibon responded by
informing the signatories that if they complained again,
they would be transferred out of Aural. The threat of
being posted to areas with fewer money-making
opportunities appears to have silenced the dissenters.50
While the district MPs dominate the protection of
luxury timber within Aural, transports along Route 4
from Kompong Speu to Phnom Penh are usually
handled by provincial level MPs under Men Sibon.
Convoys guarded by provincial-level MPs collect
luxury timber cut in Aural Wildlife Sanctuary and
also Kirirom National Park and then proceed up
Route 4 with sirens blaring.65 Timber traders are
known to pay several hundred dollars for this service,
which though expensive, saves them paying off the
Forest Administration Mobile Task Force, which
costs even more.61
Men Sibon periodically sends Provincial MPs based
in Kompong Speu town to establish checkpoints on
Route 42 near the junction with Route 4 to take money
from timber trucks leaving Aural.50 Some Kompong
Speu MPs run their own separate timber transport
services, meanwhile. Prem Sophorn, the deputy military
police commander in Chbar Morn, for example, uses a
truck and a saloon car to transport Tumloap and
Kranhung timber.50
Prem Sophorn periodically co-operates with Peng
Leang, a member of the military police based in Treng
Trayeung, Phnom Sruoch district, who is also a luxury
timber dealer. Peng Leang buys Tumloap and other rare
wood from loggers in Kirirom National Park and sells
it on to dealers in Phnom Penh.74 Also based in Phnom
Sruoch district is military police commander Roeurng
Vey, who organises armed escorts for trucks carrying
luxury wood along Route 4.50
Logjam
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Forest Administration Director 
Ty Sokhun
The new Forest Administration building Phnom Penh; construction
was funded by a loan from the World Bank
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In June, Phan Pheary was summoned to appear
before Kompong Speu provincial court. The focus of
the hearing that followed was not the forester’s
violation of Article 101 and other sections of the
Forestry Law, however; but his refusal to pay the illegal
loggers for the Beng wood. This outcome underlines
the complete lack of credibility of both Cambodia’s
judiciary and also the Forest Administration. Following
the FA’s bluster about Ty Sokhun personally overseeing
prosecution of Phan Pheary under Article 101, one is
left to conclude either that the FA was lying, or that Ty
Sokhun wields less clout with the Kompong Speu
judiciary than the Beng loggers.
On 21 June 2004, Phan Pheary took the precaution
of inviting around 10 staff from the provincial court to
a dinner in Kompong Speu town that cost more than
US$200. Those in attendance included the prosecutor
due to lead the case against him, Ven Yoeun.83 Three
weeks later, Ven Yoeun announced that he would not be
pursuing a case against Phan Pheary “because he was
already fined and withdrawn from his position”.84
Neither Ty Sokhun, nor the judiciary have made any
further public reference to the prosecution of Phan
Pheary under Article 101 of the Forestry Law and the
case appears to have been dropped. 
10.2 Forest Administration Mobile Task Force
Roath Sovannara’s position as head of the Forest
Administration’s Mobile Task Force affords him
unparalleled opportunities for extortion and his teams
tax illegal logging operations across Cambodia.85 It is
estimated that Roath Sovannara collects approximately
US$70,000 – US$100,000 in bribes per month.86 On
May 31 2004 he received official recognition of his efforts
in the form of medal from Prime Minister Hun Sen.
Around Aural, Roath Sovannara delegates much of
the work to his deputy, who is known as Ta Nang. In
May, Ta Nang and five other FA staff were operating a
checkpoint in Veal Pon commune, at the border
between Thpong and Oudong districts, and collecting
bribes from timber trucks.87
Timber trade workers reported the foresters to be
charging substantially higher rates than other groups
collecting fees. For example, while businesses
transporting luxury grade timber were required to pay
US$20 per m3 to Aural district Governor Chem Sarim,
they were being charged US$50 per m3 by the Forest
Administration Mobile Task Force.47 The Mobile Task
Force receives US$1,000 from B-70 officers Mao and
Maorng for each timber convoy they transport.50
The rates charged by Ta Nang’s mobile team at the
checkpoint in Thpong for small trucks with capacity 
3-5 m3 were as follows:
Firewood US$7.5 per truck 
Sawn timber US$15 per truck
Round logs US$15 per truck
Luxury timber US$100 per truck47
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In a separate incident, on 7 April, Military Region 3
soldiers fired over the heads of foresters at a checkpoint
in Ta Sal commune following the foresters’ seizure of a
truck there two days previously.29
Foresters based in Pursat also levy fees from the
timber industry. In early 2004, timber traders were
using an upgraded track running southwest from
Bamnak to the foot of Aural Mountain and paying a
Pursat forester known as ‘A’ Barang for the privilege.77
10.1 Phan Pheary and “Om Yentieng’s Third Wife”
One case of corruption
among FA staff in Aural
which has been widely
publicised, involves an
alleged consort of Om
Yentieng, Prime Minister
Hun Sen’s Advisor on
Human Rights. Om
Yentieng is a prominent
public figure, well known
for his robust defence of the
government’s poor human
rights record. 
The lawlessness in Aural
has caught the attention of members of the Cambodian
political elite seeking quality home furnishings. In early
2004, a woman identified by timber vendors in Aural as
“Om Yentieng’s third wife”, embarked on a makeover
of a property in Phnom Penh. In line with prevailing
Cambodian trends in interior design, she commissioned
doors and window frames made of Beng wood, a rare
tree species protected by law.78
Through contacts in the Forest Administration, she
enlisted the help of the head of the Sangke Sartob
Forest Administration section, Phan Pheary – an
official with a track record of involvement in illegal
timber deals in and around the wildlife sanctuary.37
Phan Pheary’s wife would later claim that she and her
husband visited Om Yentieng and the woman at their
home in Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh, to discuss details of
the deal.78 “Om Yentieng’s third wife” paid Phan
Pheary US$300 to acquire papers which might lend the
deal an air of legality, which the forester duly did.30
Phan Pheary made contact with a group of six
people based in O’Taong village, Trapeang Chou
commune, through the village chief, Pong Sokit, and
told them that he needed to buy timber for Om
Yentieng’s wife.78 The villagers provided him with 
4.3 m3 of Beng wood, which they had logged illegally
inside the wildlife sanctuary. On 10 February, “Om
Yentieng’s third wife”, together with Phan Pheary and
two bodyguards visited O’Taong to inspect the timber. 
The next day, Phan Pheary and his accomplice, the
Trapeang Chou FA section head, Yang Yarith, rented a
truck from Thpong district military police to transport
the timber out of Aural. They had got as far as the
Thpong Forest Administration office, when they were
stopped by a group of rangers supported by the NGO
Conservation International, who confiscated the timber,
as well as a loaded, but un-licenced AK-47 rifle that
Phan Pheary was carrying in his car.5 Attempts by “Om
Yentieng’s third wife” to negotiate the release of the
timber were not successful.78 Another forester involved
in the deal later complained, somewhat revealingly,
about the way in which CI and the rangers had failed to
respect established protocol:
“The NGO stopped (Phan Pheary). He said, ‘this
wood is for Om Yentieng’s lady who is building a house’
– meaning that it should not be a problem because it is
for a top official’s house. But the NGO didn’t care.”78
Phan Pheary and Yang Yarith’s actions violated
several provisions of the Forestry Law, not least Article
101 relating to crimes committed by FA staff. However,
in communications with CI following the seizure of the
timber, the head of the Forest Crime Monitoring and
Reporting Unit at the Forest Administration, Ieng
Saveth, proposed that Phan Pheary and Yang Yarith
each be let off with a warning. Saveth offered no legal
justification for this leniency, reinforcing the impression
that the FA condones criminal acts by its staff.5
Despite repeated public exposure of criminal acts by
foresters in the two years since the passage of the
Forestry Law, not one FA staff member has been
prosecuted in line with Article 101. In this regard, it is
worth noting that failure by FA senior staff to
prosecute perpetrators of forest crimes in accordance
with the law is itself an offence under the same article,
which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison. 
Reacting to media interest in the case, FA Director
Ty Sokhun subsequently announced that the two
officials had been recalled to Phnom Penh in order to
be “re-educated” and added that Phan Pheary had been
fined US$2,500.5 It is not known to whom this fine was
paid. In June, the Forest Administration claimed that
Ty Sokhun was filing a prosecution against Phan Pheary
under Article 101 and that the case was in the hands of
the Kompong Speu provincial court.79
Meanwhile, Phan Pheary found himself hounded by
the unpaid and increasingly irate villagers who had cut
the Beng wood. In April, a deputation of the loggers
converged on Phan Pheary’s house in Oudong to
demand payment. Although Phan Pheary succeeded 
in evading their attentions, local residents reported that
the forester resorted to entering and exiting his house
through a rear window in order to reduce the risks 
of detection.80
In mid May, six of the villagers from O’Taong paid a
US$25 fee to Kompong Speu provincial court officials
to lodge an official complaint against Phan Pheary,
citing his failure to pay them for their illegal logging
operation.81 The villagers also submitted supporting
documentation supplied by the O’Taong village chief
and the Trapeang Chou commune chief.82
11 MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT
Ministry of Environment activities in
Aural and other protected areas are
directed by the MoE Department
of Nature Conservation and
Protection, headed by Chay
Samith. Chay Samith reports to
MoE Minister Mok Mareth.
Aural Wildlife Sanctuary Ranger Ty
Tola previously ran a timber business in Aural until he
paid MoE staff to acquire his current position.29 The
switch appears to have been motivated by commercial
considerations and Ty Tola has used his official role to
extort money from competitors in the timber trade.
Sources in the timber business allege that Ty Tola has
been able to make between US$2,000 and US$4,000 per
month in this manner.29 He also continues his own
logging operations, and is recorded in the district
authorities’ register as the owner of a chainsaw.43
Local residents claim that it was Ty Tola’s
confiscation of seven ox-carts from villagers that set the
scene for the clashes between loggers and rangers over
the weekend of 19-21 March. They also blame Aural
Wildlife Sanctuary Director Meas Nhim for his alleged
failure to prevent Ty Tola from collecting bribes. Some
voice further grievances against Meas Nhim, saying that
his enforcement is selective and that he is allowing his
own relatives to log in the wildlife sanctuary.29
People living in Aural claim that the rangers run a
checkpoint outside their station in Kantuot for the
collection of bribes of one to five US$ per ox-cart and
that these activities are only interrupted when FFI
expatriate staff are present. Timber traders report that
rangers allow them to carry on operating sawmills as
long as they pay a fee.32
Ox-cart convoy carrying luxury timber from the forest
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12 POLICE
Cambodia’s police report to the
Ministry of Interior headed by Co-
Ministers Sar Kheng and Prince
Norodom Sirivudh. National
Director-General of the Police,
Hok Lundy, is a four star general
and a close associate of Prime
Minister Hun Sen. The police are involved
in illegal logging and extortion across Cambodia.
The district police in Aural are less powerful than
the military groups active in the area, because they have
fewer personnel and less firepower. They find it
difficult to collect bribes from soldiers involved in the
illegal timber trade, but have more success extorting
money from civilian timber traders, chainsaw, sawmill
and ox-cart operators in the forest.
In this capacity, they co-operate closely with Aural
district authorities. The
police use the list of illegal
operators compiled and
updated by the district
authorities as a basis for
illegal taxation and they pass
a proportion of the money
they collect to district
governor Chem Sarim, who
in turn provides a share to
provincial Deputy Governor
Yim Sokhom.88 Chainsaw
operators say that they have
to register with the police
and district authorities
before they start logging. The standard fees levied by
Aural police are up to US$100 per sawmill and US$15-
25 per chainsaw.33 Collection of payments appears to
follow an irregular pattern and paying off the police
does not guarantee illegal operators a defined period of
immunity from further extortion.48
When not taxing chainsaw operators, the Aural
police are often busy logging themselves. Six out of 17
members of the district police are listed as chainsaw
operators in the Aural district authorities’ register:
Phrak Moul, Rouern, Mam Ann, San Sor Rith, Leng
Nee and Sang Bun Nang.43
Despite being out-gunned by military units, in May
2004, police chief Dos Sim decided to crack down on
the transports of luxury timber orchestrated by the
MPs. This was driven less by concern for the law than
Dos Sim’s indignation at the insolent manner in which
the MPs were transporting timber past the Aural police
office without consulting or compensating him first.73
On 25 May 2004 Aural police intercepted a group of
MPs who were guarding a convoy of ox-carts extracting
1.6 m3 of Tumloap wood from forest near Choam
village, Roleak Khang Cherng. The businessman who
had ordered the wood, Mr Hok, was unable to prevent
police from confiscating it. After consulting with
provincial economic police chief, Chea Daro, Dos Sim
had the wood transported to the police headquarters in
Kompong Speu town.73
Three days later, on 28 May, Dos Sim launched
another operation against the district MPs. This time,
police officers confiscated 11 pieces of Tumloap wood,
amounting to around 1 m3, which were being escorted
by MPs and soldiers in Rasmei Samaki commune. These
operations raised the stakes substantially for timber
businesses trying to transport luxury wood out of
Aural. When a convoy carrying around 10 m3 of
Tumloap wood drove from Aural to Route 4 on 
May 31, it was escorted by around 60 soldiers from
Battalion 313.61
Dos Sim is required to pass the lion’s share of the
bribes that he collects in Aural to Kompong Speu
provincial police headed by Commander Nob Oeun.30
Among provincial level police, those most active in
Aural are members of the economic police led by
commander Chea Daro and his deputy, Mr Peng, both
of whom are based in Kompong Speu. Cambodia’s
economic police tend to specialise in ‘soft’ law
enforcement areas such as taxation of illegal timber
operations. Chea Daro periodically sends provincial
level economic police to Aural to set up checkpoints
and extort in the same manner as many of the 
non-resident military units making money in the
wildlife sanctuary.89
Apparently independent from the police based in
Aural and Kompong Speu, is a police officer based in
Phnom Sruoch district known as ‘A’ Try Angkot, who
deals in luxury timber. ‘A’ Try Angkot buys luxury
wood cut in areas of Koh Kong province, Kirirom
National Park and also Aural. Wood cut in Aural he
extracts directly to Kompong Speu town, or along a
route that runs from Aural via Krandei Vey and
Chambok, to Phnom Sruoch.47
Pursat police also benefit from Aural’s timber boom
and operate checkpoints on the tracks and roads
running from the northwestern boundary of the
wildlife sanctuary to Route 5. In early 2004, officers
manning a police post in Kbal Teahean village were
collecting bribes from the nocturnal convoys of ox-
carts transporting wood from Aural. Each cart was
charged between US$1.25 and US$5.90
According to wood traders, the Kbal Teahean police
post functions as a kind of informal meeting point for
people organising timber deals. The police have a large
radio antenna, which they use to alert loggers and wood
traders in the event of law enforcement operations
taking place.90
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13 LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Like the police, provincial, district and commune
officials in Cambodia all follow a chain of command
emanating from the RGC Ministry of Interior.
On 5 February 2003, Kompong Speu governor Ou
Bun wrote to all district chiefs in
Kompong Speu concerning forest
crimes. The letter called upon the
district authorities to suppress illegal
logging and hunting and also
instructed them to “find the locations
of sawmills and chainsaws that are
operating in your area”.91 While the
injunction to curtail forest crime has
generally been ignored, the district
governor in Aural and the commune
chiefs under him have been diligent in
their identification of illegal cutting and
processing operations in their areas of
jurisdiction. Rather than using this
information as a basis for
enforcement of the law, the district
authorities in Aural have instead
adopted it as the foundation for a shadow taxation
regime based on extortion.
Chem Sarim keeps a register of all those operating
chainsaws and sawmills in Aural district and
newcomers are required to present themselves before
commencing activities. Once registered, the chainsaw
and sawmill owners can be taxed. Payments are
collected on average once a month, usually at a rate of
US$15-25 per chainsaw and US$30-50 per sawmill.
These fees are collected by district officials or police
commanded by Dos Sim.48
A copy of the register, dated December 18 2003, lists
104 chainsaws and sawmills. The author, District
Environment Officer Som Tha, notes that 10-15 new
chainsaws recently brought into Aural Wildlife
Sanctuary had not yet been recorded. The register
provides names of equipment owners, their profession,
address, type of machinery used and the location of
operation. The operators recorded include: one
village chief, two Kompong Speu Provincial
Military Sub-Operation
soldiers, two members of the
military engineering group,
six Aural district police
officers and 17 members of
Battalion 313.43
The system appears to be
efficiently run and local
residents report that un-
registered chainsaw operators
are generally detected and
then run the risk of having
their equipment confiscated.33
Chem Sarim also organises
the collection of fees from
vehicles transporting wood,
charging US$20 per m3 for luxury
timber and a lower rate for commercial grade sawn
timber. He passes a percentage of the funds accrued up
to Kompong Speu Deputy Governor Yim Sokhom.92
Commune level chiefs under Chem Sarim also
collect money from sawmill operations. Once a month,
Sangke Sartob commune chief Heng Sophal summons
wood traders and sawmill owners to a meeting at 
which they each pay taxes to the district authorities92
Heng Sophal claims that these fees are used to build
schools and support the salaries of district officials. Hen
Ren, the commune chief in Am Leang, also keeps a list
of sawmills and chainsaws to use as a basis for taxing
the operators.93
Letter from Provincial Governor Ou Bun, ordering
district governors to suppress forest crimes
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14 TIMBER DEALERS
14.1 Peng Ly
Peng Ly is perhaps the biggest luxury timber dealer in
southwestern Cambodia; sourcing wood from Aural,
Kirirom National Park and protected forest areas in
Koh Kong province. He is the brother of Sre Ambel
timber dealer Veng I and Aural timber tax collector
Veng II. Peng Ly has cultivated close ties with Military
Region 3, going as far as purchasing the identity of a
demobilised RCAF soldier of the same name, which he
uses as pretext for wearing military dress.61
Peng Ly works through locally-based soldiers and
civilian loggers in Aural and visits the area regularly to
commission cutting operations. Orders from Peng Ly
are highly specific, including not only the tree species,
but also the dimensions of the pieces of timber required.
In 2004, Peng Ly’s main target has been Tumloap trees;
the most valuable of the luxury timbers in Cambodia.
The prices he pays for Tumloap vary accord to diameter:
15-30 cm US$700 per m3 
30-45 cm US$1300 per m3 
45-60 cm US$2200 per m3 
60-85 cm US$3500 per m3 48
When commissioning a cutting operation, Peng Ly
generally pays the loggers half the agreed price up front,
in order to ensure that they will not sell the wood to
another dealer once they have cut it. He then returns to
collect the timber around two weeks afterwards,
transporting it under armed guard to a depot in
Kompong Speu and then on to Phnom Penh and
Vietnam.48 Peng Ly works with a range of military
commanders and military police officers and often pays
them to escort his trucks.61
Peng Ly’s luxury wood transports in Kirirom were
reportedly suppressed on 28 April, however this
appears to have had little impact on his operations in
Aural. In the second half of June, Peng Ly was
continuing to commission loggers based in Aural to cut
Tumloap trees on his behalf. In the same month,
however, he got into a dispute with rival luxury wood
trader ‘Sao’ Sokhoeurn, who accused him of stealing his
customers. Peng Ly is now said to be afraid to go to
Aural and instead is sending representatives to broker
timber deals on his behalf.64
The interruption to the Tumloap trade with Vietnam
in June left Peng Ly with a stock of Tumloap that he
was unable to sell on to customers as planned. As of late
July, Peng Ly was storing 6-7 m3 of Tumloap at his
house in Kompong Speu town.96
14.2 Mr Tong
Mr Tong is a Vietnamese businessman who specialises in
exporting illegally logged black wood luxury timber to
Vietnam. He sources much of this from Aural and
Kirirom National Park and one of his main suppliers is
Peng Ly. Tong pays Peng Ly as much as double the price
that Peng Ly pays to the loggers who cut the wood.95
Tong has timber from Kompong Speu delivered to
three houses that he rents in different areas of Phnom
Penh: Chak Angrei Loeu, Boeung Trabek and a location
close to Wat Dan Bouk Khbous pagoda.95
14.3 Hear Seng
Another of Peng Ly’s main customers, Hear Seng is a
luxury timber dealer who sources wood from several
different provinces, including Kompong Speu, Koh
Kong, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear.
Sources in the timber industry report that he is also the
uncle of Bun Rany, the wife of Prime Minister Hun Sen.
Hear Seng transports the timber that he buys from
Neak Loeung to Vietnam.95
Aside from Peng Ly, Hear Seng buys wood from
Peng Leang, Veng I and other luxury timber dealers.95
14.4 Sao Sokhoeurn
Timber dealer ‘Sao’ Sokhoeurn is so-called in
recognition of his long-standing business partnership
with national military police chief Sao Sokha, to whom
he supplies illegally logged luxury timber.50 ‘Sao’
Sokhoeurn has been active in Aural over several years.
He commissions loggers to cut rare luxury tree species
and is known to accompany these orders with down-
payments of several thousand dollars. Areas in which he
regularly organises logging operations include Aural,
Trapeang Chou, Am Leang and Chreav.61
‘Sao’ Sokhoeurn arranges extraction and
transportation of the timber with Saom Puthdara, but is
also known to cooperate occasionally in illegal timber
deals with Aural district police chief Dos Sim.61 ‘Sao’
Sokhoeurn and Saom Puthdara’s transports of luxury
timber to Phnom Penh and Takeo province were
temporarily interrupted during early May and they
were obliged to stock the wood in Kompong Speu.95
14.5 Yeay Bong
Yeay Bong is a luxury timber dealer based in Phnom
Penh, who regularly sources wood from Aural. She
transports timber from Aural and other areas of the
southwest in two blue Korean trucks, often in
cooperation with wood trader Veng I.61
14.6 Mr Kat
Mr Kat is a former Khmer Rouge soldier who defected
to the government in the mid 1990s. He now works
with the group of soldiers commanded by lieutenant-
generals Mol Roeup and Dom Hak and carries papers
identifying himself as a member of the RCAF military
intelligence division.29 
Kat lives in Sok Veng village, Trapeang Chou, and
owns two sawmills in the vicinity. Timber is supplied to
these mills by his associate, Ta Kreum, who sometimes
manages them on Kat’s behalf. Kat owns two houses in
Trapeang Chou and another in Am Leang commune.46
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When not presenting himself as a military intelligence
agent, Kat passes himself off as a soldier from Battalion
313. This has recently brought him into conflict with the
battalion commander Somrith Reang.50 Kat also has
connections with Saom Puthdara and the Aural district
MPs, whom he periodically hires to protect his
transports of sawn timber to Kompong Speu.76
14.7 Ta Kreum
Ta Kreum is accused by conservation groups working
in Aural of being one of the main instigators of violence
against rangers and NGO staff over the weekend of 
19-21 March 2004.37
On 11 March rangers supported by Conservation
International arrested Ta Kreum at an illegal sawmill,
where he was found in possession of an unlicenced rifle.
Kreum was subsequently sighted in Spean Daik on
several occasions. He was over-heard saying that he had
paid US$2500 for his release by the Kompong Speu
authorities and that he was prepared to spend an
additional US$1250 to see the rangers thrown out of
Aural.37 On 20 March, following clashes between
loggers and rangers the previous night in Spean Daik,
Kreum was observed in Kantuot, carrying a gun and
dispensing threats against the MoE rangers.37
Formerly a Khmer Rouge soldier in Aural, Kreum
works as a sub-contractor for another ex-Khmer Rouge
cadre, Mr Kat, organising ox-carts and cutting crews to
bring logs to Kat’s sawmills, which Kreum sometimes
supervises on his behalf. It appears that he offers these
services to other timber traders in Aural as well.46
Residents of Aural, meanwhile, report that Kreum has a
history of confiscating chainsaws and other equipment
from loggers in Aural and then using them himself.29
Kreum is also involved in transporting timber out of
Aural, using a fleet of six or seven trucks. On 16 April,
he organised the transport of seven trucks carrying
timber from various parts of Aural Wildlife Sanctuary
to Takeo. The trucks brought timber, primarily
Chheuteal and Pdiek, from various areas of the wildlife
sanctuary to a meeting point at the house of Kreum’s
mistress in Chbar Morn. The trucks continued on their
journey to Takeo before dawn the next day. The same
pattern was repeated over the next two nights.67
Aside from Kreum himself, the key facilitators in
these operations were Forest Administration officials,
who were paid US$70-US$90 per truck, depending on
the quality of timber transported by Kreum.67 In late
April, foresters in Kompong Speu claimed that Kreum’s
activities were now under control, citing the fact that he
was only illegally transporting wood in two trucks
rather than the previous seven.67
Kreum does not have a house of his own, but often
stays with a relative of Mr Kat in Sok Veng village,
Trapeang Chou commune. Residents of Sok Veng refer to
him as a “bong thom”, or “neay”, meaning boss. At the
same time, they claim that despite his reputation, Kreum
is not a major player in Aural and is more interested in
drinking than building his own timber business empire.29
14.8 Li Kea
Li Kea is a timber trader based in Spean Daik, who
operated at least one illegal sawmill in Aural up until its
destruction by MoE rangers between 8 and 9 of
February this year. Conservation workers claim that
Kea responded by threatening to shoot the rangers,
while simultaneously complaining to the district police
about their use of firearms.67 The sawmill had been
under the protection of members of the military and
Kea is said to have close connections with Mr Hai, the
sometime business partner of Mr Voeun.67 Kea owns a
big house in Spean Daik and was regarded as one of the
major suppliers of sawn timber in the area up until the
operation against his sawmill.67 He features in Chem
Sarim’s December 2003 register of illegal operators,
listed as having a sawmill in O’Kseav.43
Sawmill in Aural
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14.9 Mr Reach
Another sawmill owner, whose premises were
destroyed by rangers on 12 January 2004, Mr Reach is a
former Khmer Rouge soldier with close links to
Battalion 313 and a history of disputes with rangers.37
In 2003, Reach tried to organise a protest against CI
enforcement actions in Aural. He has also threatened to
shoot MoE rangers and lay land mines in front of their
office in Kantuot.37
14.10 Mr Ton
Mr Ton is the Director of the Department of Education
in Aural district and a successful timber trader. He
owns his own sawmill, chainsaws and around three
trucks. His brothers-in-law Sok Komar and Thong also
own sawmills.96 Another official in the provincial
education department, Horng Kim San, is listed as a
chainsaw owner in the district authorities’ December
2003 register.43
14.11 Mr Yong
Mr Yong heads a small group of timber traders
operating in Aural who are either serving or former
bodyguards of Minister for Defence Tea Banh. Local
residents describe Mr Yong’s military rank as “three
stripes”. He has been active in the timber business in
Aural for several years. Yong buys sawn timber in
Spean Daik from dealers such as Srey Oan; stockpiling
the wood at his home in Anlong Chrey commune,
Thpong district, or transporting it directly to Vietnam
via Route 4 and then Route 2.76
14.12 Srey Oan
Srey Oan runs a well-established timber business in
Spean Daik village. She buys and sells wood and often
lends money to chainsaw operators, which they pay
back in timber.97
14.13 Srey Peou
Srey Peou lives in Oudong and sources much of her
timber from Aural. She transports wood from Aural to
Oudong and Neak Loeung
both by night and by day and
is known locally for her
contempt for the law. As she
puts it, “nothing is bigger than
money”.93 On one occasion
when local officials had the
temerity to seize a quantity of
her timber, Srey Peou
responded by stuffing a
bundle of dollar bills in a sock
and throwing it on the ground
for them to pick up.93 Srey
Peou drives a white Toyota
pickup and transports timber
in a Korean truck, which she
also owns.46
14.14 Mr Hok
Mr Hok is a businessman based in Kantuot, who owns
a sawmill and chainsaws. He works closely on luxury
timber deals with the district military police. It was
Tumloap wood that his workers had cut, and which
MPs were escorting, which was confiscated by the
district police on 25 May.93
14.15 Eng Youry
Timber businessman Eng Youry is the owner of Youry
Saco – a company that controls a logging concession in
Pursat and Battambang provinces and has a documented
history of illegal logging operations.98 Since the
suspension of concession operations in 2002, Eng Youry
has diversified his activities, to include illegal cutting and
export of high value timbers, as well as sawmill
operations. According to sources in Pursat, in the dry
season months of 2004, Eng Youry was operating four
sawmills in Aural Wildlife Sanctuary. These mills were
situated at the northern end of the main valley west of
Aural Mountain, inside Pursat province. As of July, two
had ceased operations, however the others remained
active. Srun Saroeun’s Brigade 31 was providing
protection for these sawmills.50
Aside from his interests in Aural, Eng Youry is also
involved in logging and exporting luxury timber in
conjunction with Pursat wood trader Suos Ky Reth.99
In January 2002, the government suspended logging
operations in forest concessions, pending the companies’
submission of adequate sustainable forest management
plans (SFMPs) and environmental and social impact
assessments (ESIAs). The plans Youry Saco duly
submitted were notable chiefly for their feeble technical
quality, as well as the company’s claim to have discovered
chimpanzees, koala bears, racoons and moose living in its
concession.100 A World Bank-Forest Administration
team reviewing the plans has recommended no further
logging in the concession, however Youry Saco’s
investment agreement still stands. Eng Youry’s recent
illegal timber deals merely add to the overwhelming case
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14.17 Timber Traders operating sawmills in Aural district in 200497
Name Number of Sawmills Located in
Mr Cheth Sen Louth (Batt. 313) 1 O’Thmor Chroung, Sangke Sartob
Mr Da 1 O’Thmor Chroung, Sangke Sartob
Mr Hok 1 –
Mr Kat (RCAF intelligence) 2 Phlouch, Sok Veng villages
Mr Kem Korn (Batt. 313) 1 Trapeang Chou 
Li Kea 1 –
Mr A Neth 1 North of Pou Meas village
Mr Nhanh 1 Trapeang Chou
Mr Prom Kim Thong 1 Bridge No.1, Trapeang Chou
Mr Reach – –
Mr Sam Nang (police) 1 Ka Touth, Sangke Sartob
Mr Sieng 1 Trapeang Chou
Sok Komar 1 O’Thmor Chroung, Sangke Sartob
Mrs Srey 1 West of Phnom Vihear
Mr Ton – –
Mr Thong 1 –
Mr Vieng 1 O’Thmor Chroung, Sangke Sartob
14.16 Timber traders transporting wood from Aural district in 200497
Name Based in Timber Trucks
Mr Bunseang Chbar Morn 1 Korean three ton truck
Mrs Chey Kech – –
Mr Choeun Bat Deung 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Heng Tang Pour 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Heng Vit Am Leang 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Hok – –
Mr Kat (RCAF intelligence) Sok Veng 2 Korean three ton trucks
Mr Khoeun Kantuot 1 Korean three ton truck
Ta Kreum Sok Veng 6-7 trucks
Li Kea Spean Daik 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Map – –
Mr Me Phnom Penh 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Mol Spean Daik 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Mos Phnom Penh 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Mor Sei Ma – –
Peng Ly Kompong Speu –
Mr Pim Kantuot 1 Korean three ton truck
Sao Sokhoeurn – –
Sok Komar – –
Srey Oan Spean Daik 1 Korean three ton truck
Srey Peou Oudong 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Ton Aural 3 trucks
Mr Thol Anlong Chrey 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Thorn Aural 1 Korean three ton truck
Mr Thorn Oudong 1 Korean three ton truck
Yeay Bong Phnom Penh 2 Korean three ton trucks
Yeay Dy – –
Mr Yong Anlong Chrey 1 Korean three ton truck
Loaded truck belonging to timber trader Mr Me near Che’en village
Conclusion
15 CONCLUSION 
In Aural, all the public institutions responsible for
protecting the forest are corrupted and some, notably
RCAF, form the bedrock of the local timber industry. 
The existence of a shadow taxation regime that
functions more efficiently than the national system,
underlines the extent to which Aural’s problems are
ones of governance. The reasons why there is no rule of
law in Aural relate neither to shortage of personnel and
technical skills, nor lack of information about criminal
activities. They are rooted in Cambodia’s pervasive
culture of impunity and the perception of official rank
as a licence to extort. 
No scientific assessment of the impact of illegal
logging on Aural’s forests has yet been undertaken.
However the illegal timber industry that this report
profiles is clearly eroding the conservation value that
the wildlife sanctuary was designed to preserve. Beyond
the loss of biodiversity, the environmental services
offered by Aural’s forests, notably their role in
watershed management, are also in jeopardy.
Experience elsewhere suggests that deforestation of
Mount Aural’s slopes will accelerate soil erosion and
flash flooding, impacting negatively on the livelihoods
of people living in the surrounding region. 
The adverse impacts are not only environmental,
but also social. Local people are obliged to live in a
society dominated by organised crime, where the law
offers no protection. In such circumstances, the
For this leverage to be effective, donors need to
coordinate and create clear linkages between
disbursements of non-humanitarian aid and the
government’s progress in tackling corruption. Where
conditions are not met, the outcome should be the
withholding of aid, rather than hasty watering down of
the targets. The basis for a set of performance benchmarks
is set out in the recommendations section of this report.
indigenous Souy minority are among the most
vulnerable and the influx of outsiders brought in to
work the timber industry threatens them economically
and culturally.
Aural is not an isolated case; indeed corruption
constitutes the main threat to Cambodia’s forests and
the country’s overall development. Lack of political will
is regularly cited by donors as the main obstacle to
combating corruption in Cambodia. However, the case
of Aural shows that the culpability of senior officials
and generals goes far beyond mere dragging of feet.
Corruption in the forest sector is an intrinsic part of the
patronage systems that sustain the power of
Cambodia’s political elite. Many, perhaps the majority
of the officials and soldiers involved in forest crime, are
simply following a clear chain of command emanating
from Phnom Penh. The situation is not anarchic, and
the perpetrators are not rogue elements. 
Such unpalatable realities make it highly unlikely
that the Cambodian government will tackle corruption
unless pressured to do so. The onus here must be on
Cambodia’s international donors, who continue to
bank-roll the country and wield considerable influence
as a result. The donor community is well aware of the
need to tackle corruption head-on, if any progress is to
be made in establishing sustainable forest management.
Most, however, appear more interested in disbursing aid
for its own sake, than ensuring that Cambodia’s natural
resources are managed for all Cambodians and not just
a corrupt minority. 
Conclusion
l-r General Pol Saroeun, Prime Minister Hun Sen, General Kun Kim, General Meas Sophea, Lt-General Moeng Samphan
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To date, Cambodia represents one of the best
examples of how not to address the role of natural
resources in a post-conflict country. This despite
unprecedented opportunities to put in place the
conditions for sound natural resource management. A
hard question needs to be asked – if the international
community cannot get it right in Cambodia, what hope
for other post-conflict countries blighted by resource
wars and highly corrupted resource sectors?
International donors have
responsibilities both to the Cambodian
population and their own taxpayers, to
ensure that aid is well-spent and has a
beneficial and lasting impact.
Corruption in Cambodia is
undermining the effectiveness of all aid-
funded programmes and for this reason
alone, donors have an obligation to
make use of their leverage. 
Over-logged valley near Reang Khvav Mountain
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Undertake actions, including cooperation among the
law enforcement authorities within and among
countries, to prevent the movement of illegal timber;
Explore ways in which the export and import of
illegally harvested timber can be eliminated, including
the possibility of a prior notification system for
commercially traded timber;
Help raise awareness, through the media and other
means, of forest crimes and the threats which forest
destruction poses to our future environmental,
economic and social wellbeing;
Improve forest-related governance in our countries 
in order to enforce forest law, inter alia to better 
enforce property rights and promote the independence
of the judiciary;
Involve stakeholders, including local communities, in
decision-making in the forestry sector, thereby
promoting transparency, reducing the potential for
corruption, ensuring greater equity, and minimizing the
undue influence of privileged groups;
Improve economic opportunities for those relying on
forest resources to reduce the incentives for illegal
logging and indiscriminate forest conversion, in order
to contribute to sustainable forest management;
Review existing domestic forest policy frameworks and
institute appropriate policy reforms, including those
relating to granting and monitoring concessions,
subsidies, and excess processing capacity, to prevent
illegal practices;
Give priority to the most vulnerable transboundary
areas, which require coordinated and responsible action;
Develop and expand at all appropriate levels work on
monitoring and assessment of forest resources;
Undertake the demarcation, accurate and timely
mapping, and precise allocation of forest areas, and
make this information available to the public;
Strengthen the capacity within and among
governments, private sector and civil society to prevent,
detect and suppress forest crime.
Further, in order to give full effect to the intentions of
this Declaration, and to proceed with urgency 
to explore timely implementation of significant
indicative actions developed by technical experts at 
this meeting, we:
Undertake to create a regional task force on forest law
enforcement and governance to advance the objectives
of this Declaration;
Invite the representatives at this conference from
NGOs, industry, civil society and other relevant
stakeholders to consider forming an advisory group to
the regional taskforce;
Decide to meet again at the Ministerial level in 2003 to
review progress on first actions to implement these
commitments, in cooperation with relevant
international partners;
Request the ASEAN and APEC countries participating
in this Conference to inform the next ASEAN and
APEC Summits of the outcome of this Ministerial
Conference and to invite their support;
Pledge to work to see that the issue of forest crime is
given significant attention in future international fora,
including by the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) and the United Nations Forum
on Forests, and by the member organizations of the
Collaborative Partnership on Forests;
Request the G-8 countries and other donors to consider
further how they can join in the fight against forest
crime, including through capacity building efforts;
Encourage other regions to consider creating similar
regional initiatives to combat forest Crime.
Bali, Indonesia
13 September 2001
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16 APPENDIX 1: FOREST LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
EAST ASIA MINISTERIAL
DECLARATION
East Asia Ministerial Conference
Bali, Indonesia
11-13 September 2001
Countries from the East Asian and other regions
participating in this Ministerial Conference:
Understanding that forest ecosystems support human,
animal and plant life, and provide humanity with a rich
endowment of natural, renewable resources;
Deeply concerned with the serious global threat posed
to this endowment by negative effects on the rule of law
by violations of forest law and forest crime, in
particular illegal logging and associated illegal trade;
Recognizing that illegal logging and associated illegal
trade directly threaten ecosystems and biodiversity in
forests throughout Asia and the rest of our world;
Also recognizing the resulting serious economic and
social damage upon our nations, particularly on local
communities, the poor and the disadvantaged;
Further recognizing that the problem has many
complex social, economic, cultural and political causes;
Convinced of the urgent need for, and importance of
good governance to, a lasting solution to the problem of
forest crime;
Recognizing that all countries, exporting and
importing, have a role and responsibility in combating
forest crime, in particular the elimination of illegal
logging and associated illegal trade;
Emphasizing the urgent need for effective cooperation
to address these problems simultaneously at the national
and sub-national, regional and international levels;
Declare that we will:
Take immediate action to intensify national efforts, and
to strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral
collaboration to address violations of forest law and
forest crime, in particular illegal logging, associated
illegal trade and corruption, and their negative effects
on the rule of law;
Develop mechanisms for effective exchange of
experience and information;
Cutting site, Aural Wildlife Sanctuary, April 2004
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to bring to justice police officers and other employees
of police forces/services who are corrupt.
Article 2
Definitions
Corruption includes:
(c) The solicitation or acceptance, whether directly or
indirectly, by a police officer or other employee of a
police force/service of any money, article of value, gift,
favour, promise, reward or advantage, whether for
himself/herself or for any person, group or entity, in
return for any act or omission already done or omitted
or to be done or omitted in the future in or in
connection with the performance of any function of or
connected with policing.
(d) The offering or granting, whether directly or
indirectly, to a police officer or other employee of a
police force/service of any money, article of value, gift,
favour, promise, reward or advantage for the police
officer or other employee or for any person, group or
entity in return for any act or omission already done or
omitted or to be done or omitted in the future in or in
connection with the performance of any function of or
connected with policing.
(e) Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a
police officer or other employee of a police
force/service which may improperly expose any person
to a charge or conviction for a criminal offence or may
improperly assist in a person not being charged with or
being acquitted of a criminal offence.
(f) The unauthorized dissemination of confidential 
or restricted police information whether for reward 
or otherwise.
(g) Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a
police officer or other employee of a police
force/service for the purpose of obtaining any money,
article of value, gift, favour, promise, reward or
advantage for himself/herself or any other person,
group or entity.
(h) Any act or omission which constitutes corruption
under a law of the Member State.
(i) Participation as a principal, co-principal, initiator,
instigator, accomplice, accessory before the fact, accessory
after the fact, conspirator or in any other manner in the
commission or attempted commission of any act referred
to in the preceding provisions of this Article.
Police force/service means each police force or police
service or other official body with a responsibility to
perform policing functions within the national
boundaries of the Member State.
Article 3
Principles
(a) To make corruption within police forces/services a
high-risk crime.
(b) To promote and maintain a high standard of
honesty, integrity and ethical behaviour within the
police forces/services of each Member.
(c) To foster the recruitment and training as police
officers of persons of high levels of integrity, honesty,
ethical standards and expertise.
Article 4
Measures
4. Each member of the General Assembly commits to:
Standards of Conduct
4.1 Establishing and maintaining high standards of
conduct for the honest, ethical and effective
performance of policing functions.
4.1.1 Such standards should mandate and be directed
towards an understanding and application of honest,
ethical and appropriate behaviour, the avoidance of
conflicts of interest, the proper use of public resources
in and in connection with the fair and impartial
application of the law, the performance of policing
functions, the reporting of acts of corruption in and in
connection with and the performance of policing
functions and the establishment and strengthening of
public confidence in police officers and police
forces/services as part of the system of justice.
4.1.2 Such standards should accept that it is an
obligation of the police force/service to seek out and
effectively deal with corruption within the police
force/service.
4.1.3 Such standards should impose an obligation on
police officers and other employees of a police
force/service to report to the appropriate person or
authority acts or omissions, which constitute or may
constitute corruption within the police force/service.
4.2 Setting up and maintaining effective mechanisms to
oversee and enforce the high standards of conduct
required in and in connection with the performance of
policing functions;
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RESOLUTION ON ADOPTING GLOBAL
STANDARDS TO COMBAT
CORRUPTION IN POLICE
FORCES/SERVICES
AG-2002-RES-01 
RESOLUTION
Subject: Adopting the global standards to combat
corruption in police forces/services 
The ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in
Yaoundé from 21 to 24 October 2002 at its 71st session:
RECALLING Resolution No. AG-2001-RES-04
adopted by the General Assembly at its 70th session
(Budapest, September 2001),
CONVINCED that corruption undermines the
effectiveness of law enforcement, the efficiency and
legitimacy of police forces/services in the performance
of their functions and public confidence in law
enforcement and justice,
FURTHER CONVINCED that corruption within
police forces/services can be prevented and eradicated
by determined and forceful national action by all
Member States and by international co-operation,
CONSIDERING that effective policing requires the
combating of all forms of corruption in the
performance of policing functions and the promotion of
high standards of honesty, integrity and ethical
behaviour for police officers and other employees of
police forces/services,
PERSUADED that determined efforts to fight
corruption and promote high standards of honesty,
integrity and ethical behaviour increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of police forces/services and enhance
support for law enforcement by civil society,
FURTHER PERSUADED that policing will only be
effective if those involved in the criminal justice system,
such as prosecutors, magistrates and judges, also have
high standards of honesty, integrity and ethical
behaviour and are determined to give leadership to
others also involved in the criminal justice system,
RECOGNIZING the need to make the citizens of
Member States aware of the detrimental effects of
corruption on law and order, public and individual
safety, the preservation of property and the cost of 
law enforcement,
FURTHER RECOGNIZING the responsibility of
Member States to detect and hold accountable corrupt
police officers and other employees of police
forces/services and to bring them to justice,
DETERMINED to take forceful action to prevent,
detect, punish and eradicate corruption in, and in
connection with, the performance of policing functions
and to promote high standards of honesty, integrity,
ethical behaviour and efficiency in police forces/services
within their national boundaries,
ACCEPTING that each of the principles and measures
included in the “Standards” have been deemed as
sufficiently important in the fight against Corruption 
to be included by the Interpol Group of Experts in 
this document,
ACKNOWLEDGING that the document read 
as a whole represents an ideal which Member States
should strive to reach, but that the implementation 
of any of these principles and measures is a step in 
the right direction,
AGREES to adopt the Global standards to combat
corruption in police forces/services appended to Report
No. 10 as standards whose endorsement and
implementation by police throughout the world would
improve the quality of police and the quality of the
service they provide. Member countries are therefore
encouraged to disseminate these global standards as
widely as possible within their police forces/services.
Adopted. 
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Appendix 
GLOBAL STANDARDS TO COMBAT
CORRUPTION
IN POLICE FORCES/SERVICES
Article 1
Objectives
(a) To ensure that the police forces/services of each
Member State of Interpol have high standards of
honesty, integrity and ethical behaviour in and in
connection with the performance of their policing
functions.
(b) To promote and strengthen the development by
each Member State of Interpol of measures needed to
prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the
police forces/services within its national boundaries and
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General
4.21 Making corruption by a police officer or 
other employee of a police force/service a serious
criminal offence;
4.22 Having legislation enacted to allow the proceeds of
corruption and related crimes to be forfeited;
4.23 Bringing into being or causing to be brought into
being such legislative, administrative and other
measures as may be necessary to prevent, detect, punish
and eradicate corruption in the police forces/services;
4.24 Taking all practicable steps to ensure that the rates
of remuneration for police officers and other employees
of the police forces/services are such as to enable them
and their families to maintain a reasonable standard of
living without having to resort to other employment or
to corruption;
General Assembly
4.25 Reporting at least once each two years, or at such
shorter intervals as the General Assembly may resolve,
on the measures taken and the mechanisms and systems
in place to implement the standards set out in this
protocol and the effectiveness of such mechanisms,
systems and measures;
4.26 Permitting the monitoring by, and co-operating
with, such person or persons as may be appointed by
the Secretary General for the purpose of monitoring the
mechanisms, systems and measures in place in relation
to its police forces/services to achieve the objective and
meet the standards referred to in this protocol and the
effectiveness of such mechanisms, systems and measures.
Article 5
Review
The operation of this protocol shall be reviewed by the
General Secretariat of Interpol on an ongoing basis and
shall be the subject of a report to each session of the
General Assembly that is held after the expiration of
two years from the adoption of this protocol.
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Recruitment, posting, promotion and termination
4.3 Having and maintaining effective systems for the
recruitment of police officers of high levels of integrity,
honesty, ethical standards and expertise; 
4.4 Ensuring that the systems for recruitment, 
posting, promotion and termination of police officers
and other employees of the police forces/services are
not arbitrary but are based on fairness, openness, 
ability and performance;
Training
4.5 Having a system for instructing police officers and
others engaged in and in
connection with the performance of policing function
of the standards and ethical rules applicable to the
performance of such functions;
4.6 Having and maintaining a system for the training,
including on-going training, of police officers and other
employees in the police forces/services which reinforces
the high standards of conduct referred to in Article 4.1;
Corruption
4.7 Putting in place deterrents to the bribery of those
performing or engaged in or in connection with the
performance of policing functions;
4.8 Using their best endeavours to ensure that 
the mechanisms and systems for the prevention,
detection, punishment and eradication of corruption in
and in connection with the performance of policing
functions in its police forces/services are kept abreast 
of current practice as recognized by the General
Assembly of Interpol;
4.9 Having an effective system that obliges police
officers and other employees of the police
forces/services to report, enables them and members of
civil society to report corruption and that protects
those who report corruption in good faith;
4.10 Establishing mechanisms to encourage
participation by civil society in activities and efforts to
prevent corruption in the police forces/services;
4.11 Establishing and enforcing procedures for the
declaration and registration of the income, assets and
liabilities of those who perform policing functions and
of appropriate members of their families;
Systems
4.12 Having and maintaining systems of revenue
collection, money and property handling and for the
control and preservation of evidence that ensure that
those collecting or handling public money, dealing with
evidence or handling property are accountable and that
the systems are such as to deter corruption;
4.13 Having and maintaining systems for the
procurement of goods and services that are based on
openness, efficiency, equity and certainty of the rules 
to be applied and that seek the best value for money;
Monitoring
4.14 Establishing a mechanism such as an oversight
body or bodies to monitor the systems and measures
established for preventing, detecting, punishing and
eradicating corruption within the police forces/services
and the adequacy, application and effectiveness of such
systems and measures;
4.15 Conferring or causing to be conferred on a
designated authority, whether internal or external, such
powers to carry out investigations and bring to justice
without fear or favour, affection or ill will those who
engage in corruption and dishonesty in the course of or
associated with the carrying out of policing functions
and adequately resourcing and funding such authority;
4.16 Providing for a system for the recruitment 
of officers for such designated authority who are of
high integrity and that ensures that such officers are 
not disadvantaged by recruitment to any such
designated authority;
4.17 Providing adequate safeguards to prevent abuse of
powers by those engaged in the anti-corruption system
and to minimize unnecessary infringements of
individual rights;
Review, reporting and research
4.18 Requiring public reporting at least once each year
of the work and findings in relation to the monitoring
of the systems and measures referred to in Article 4.14
and their adequacy, application and effectiveness;
4.19 On-going research in relation to current best
practice for the prevention, detection, punishment and
eradication of corruption in and in connection with the
performance of policing functions;
4.20 Reviewing at appropriate and regular intervals the
measures and systems for the prevention, detection,
punishment and eradication of corruption in and in
connection with the performance of policing functions;
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